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ABSTRACT
In this Article, we explore the “stealth” use of science by the
Executive Branch to advance deregulation and highlight the limited,
existing legal and institutional constraints in place to discipline and
discourage these practices. Political appointees have employed dozens
of strategies over the years, in both Democratic and Republican
administrations, to manipulate science in ends-oriented ways that
advance the goal of deregulation. Despite this bald manipulation of
science, however, the officials frequently present these strategies as
necessary to bring “sound science” to bear on regulatory decisions. To
begin to address this problem, it is important to reconceptualize how
the administrative state addresses science-intensive decisions. Rather
than allow agencies and the White House to operate as a cohesive unit,
institutional bounds should be drawn around the scientific expertise
lodged within the agencies. We propose that the background scientific
work prepared by agency staff should be firewalled from the evaluative,
policymaking input of the remaining officials, including politically
appointed officials, in the agency.
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INTRODUCTION
Any new president who, like President Trump, campaigns on a
deregulatory platform is in for some unpleasant surprises after the
election. Undoing regulation, particularly in the areas of health, safety,
and the environment, is not as easy as it might appear. Rolling back
most major rules is tedious because it requires notice-and-comment
rulemakings under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),1 with

1. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 706(2)(a) (2012) (requiring notice and comment on informal
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all its attendant headaches and delays. But it is also difficult because
protective rules tend to be in place for reasons that transcend the
politics of a single election year. A legally solid case for less regulation
must surmount at least three significant hurdles that are endemic to
federal regulation.
First, the president’s agenda may be blocked by statutory
mandates that, in some instances, unambiguously direct agencies to
protect the public health and welfare, with uncertainties resolved on
the side of reducing risks.2 To implement deregulatory health and
environmental rules and policies, the president’s appointees will
usually need to demonstrate, as a legal matter, that the deregulatory
action is within the permissible range of actions allowed by an agency’s
statute.3
Second, the president may encounter a public that is not as excited
about deregulation as industry stakeholders. A large majority of
Americans, when asked, support existing health, safety, and
environmental protections. If anything, these Americans would like to
see them strengthened. For example, in a recent Pew Research Center
poll, 74 percent of adult respondents (90 percent of Democrats and 52
percent of Republicans) agreed with the statement that “the country
should do whatever it takes to protect the environment,” while only 23
percent agreed with the statement that “the country has gone too far
in its efforts to protect the environment.”4 If voters find that their
highly valued health, safety, and environmental protections are being
compromised to line the pocketbooks of a handful of rich corporations,
some may shift allegiances and oppose deregulation.
Third, once the president enters the oval office, he becomes the
head of a large bureaucracy that may not share his deregulatory goals.
Turning that ship around takes a much heavier hand than simply
putting into place a cadre of high-level appointees and articulating a
deregulatory agenda. If the agency career staff is resistant, effectuating
change may prove challenging because redirecting the bureaucracy is
difficult.
rulemakings and providing opportunity for judicial review of final agency action).
2. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
3. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing and remanding
EPA air toxics standard promulgated under the George W. Bush administration because the
agency’s rule violated the legal constraints imposed by the authorizing statute, the Clean Air Act).
4. Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental Issues,
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-dayheres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues [https://perma.cc/3PL6-5LTL].
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One viable solution to this dilemma is to adopt stealth “science”
strategies. By reaching into the science supporting past or ongoing
regulatory actions and changing what the record says, a deregulatory
president can sidestep at least the first two problems.5 Changing the
science underlying a regulation allows the president to stay within the
constraints of protective statutes. The president can show that the
deregulatory action does not, on the face of things, compromise the
statute’s protective goals, because the modified science demonstrates
that his policies remain comfortably within those mandates. Equally
important, manipulating the underlying science gives the public a false
assurance that their health and environment are being protected. To
this end, invoking “sound science” on behalf of an agency decision that
in fact may be based on ends-oriented manipulations of the record can
lend the patina of objectivity.
Even if hurdles one and two can be overcome by playing games
with science, the chief executive will still need to devise clever ways to
grapple with hurdle three—the large number of career staffers, many
of whom are scientists, who will most likely push back against efforts
to manipulate science. Although overcoming this third hurdle can
sometimes can be difficult, some well-worn paths by previous
administrations to manipulate science to advance deregulation are
becoming evident.6 This Article explores these strategies, uncovering a
playbook of sorts that shows how deregulation-minded presidential
administrations, including the current one, have reconfigured the
science underlying regulations to advance deregulatory policies.
In this Article, we trace out these stealth “science” strategies used
to advance deregulation and assign them to three general categories.7
First, some political manipulation of science occurs deep within the

5. Note that this tactic of covertly manipulating the science to reach a predetermined policy
result parallels in many ways the ends-oriented, legal strategy of statutory abnegation explored
by Bill Buzbee in this issue. See generally William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory Abnegation in the
Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2019) (exploring agency abnegation and its legal
implications).
6. See Gretchen T. Goldman, et al., Ensuring Scientific Integrity in the Age of Trump:
Policies to Protect Government Scientists Must Be Defended, 355 SCIENCE 696, 696 (2017)
(observing that “[a]ll modern presidents–both Republicans and Democrats–have politicized
science in some way”).
7. For purposes of this Article, we define “deregulation” broadly to include not only the
revision or retraction of existing rules, as Caroline Cecot discusses, but also deliberate efforts to
forestall the issuance of protective regulations as discussed by Sid Shapiro. See Caroline Cecot,
Deregulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68 DUKE L.J. 1593 (2019); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction and the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1805 (2019).
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record of individual decisions where the stakes for deregulation are
high. In these cases, the political manipulation targets individual
studies, model algorithms, or other basic features of the scientific
record. These manipulations sometimes, although not always, put the
administration in direct conflict with staff by dictating changes to the
staff’s expert analysis. This can result in embarrassing leaks to the press
or whistleblower complaints that are inconsistent with the stealth
nature of the enterprise. But even when the staff publicizes the
transgressions, the administration has the final say and, in some cases,
can prevail with a revised, less protective policy based on questionable
science that is not objectively “sound” or “good.”
Second, a new administration can attempt to deplete the scientific
staff and its funding and adjust the lines of authority so that the
administration makes the calls on developing the scientific record
itself. When career staff impede top-down changes to existing projects,
this second strategy reminds agency civil servants that, though the chief
executive may not be able to fire them outright, he can most assuredly
eliminate their positions. Staffers who do not fall in line are at least
alerted to the reality that they must choose their battles carefully.
Third, the administration can lay down new ground rules for how
science is used in agency decisionmaking. If designed carefully, these
rules can to lead to biased outcomes. For example, an administrator
can revise procedures to ensure that peer review is done only by
favored experts. Likewise, the administrator can dictate that career
staff only consider research that meets narrow criteria established to
tip the ultimate analysis in favor of a deregulatory policy. The political
appointees can also ensure that the computational models developed
or used by the agency are only those that move the analysis in the
desired direction. These tactics are different because they attempt to
change the ground rules for all the work that the staff does, not just the
work on individual projects.
Part I considers each of these techniques in the context of
presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, that
have employed them in the past to advance deregulatory policies.
Then, Part II analyzes these incidents before considering approaches
to reform in Part III.
An important limitation of our analysis, evident from this Article’s
title and the Symposium’s theme, is that it focuses exclusively on how
this playbook has been used by administrations interested in
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deregulation.8 However, the underlying problems in institutional
design that allow for the manipulation of science could be deployed by
any administration regardless of the desired policy. Thus, if a president
wishes to implement overly stringent regulatory policies, he or she
could deploy many of these strategies to manipulate science to advance
that agenda as well.
I. DEREGULATORY STRATEGIES
Over the years, agency heads in administrations favoring
deregulation have devised various strategies for overcoming federal
regulatory hurdles through the stealth use of science. Administrations
often present those strategies as necessary to bring “sound science” to
bear on regulatory decisions. In this first Part, many of those strategies
are identified. Examples are provided from past presidencies as well as
the Trump administration. These strategies can cloak policymaking in
the mantle of science to minimize opposition to what would otherwise
be an unpopular resolution of a regulatory issue. The public, Congress,
and even the courts may be wholly unaware that a model algorithm has
been tweaked, one or more studies have been dropped from the
analysis, or the peer review process has been manipulated to lead to
the more hospitable oversight of deregulation.
A. Adjusting the Substance of the Science
Political appointees in agencies and the White House can change
the outcome of regulatory initiatives by quietly manipulating the
substance of the science upon which the initiatives necessarily rely.
Upper-level political appointees have employed several strategies for
accomplishing this result, including censoring agency scientists,
limiting staff scientists’ input into agency decisions, tinkering with the
models that the staff employs, putting off protective regulations to
await further scientific input, rewriting reports used to support
regulations, and substituting deregulatory policy for science. These will
be taken up in roughly the order that they are applied in the
decisionmaking process.

8. Several other limitations of this Article deserve highlighting: Rather than examine all
forms of technical information used by agencies, this Article focuses only on the way natural
science is (mis)used for rules and agency policies. We do not explore, for example, possible agency
manipulation of social science and economic information. This Article also does not trace how
stealth science strategies might impact governmental funding of research, focusing instead on
regulatory decisionmaking.
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1. Censoring Science. Politically appointed officials can achieve
deregulatory ends by preventing the dissemination of scientific
information, thereby reducing the probability that outsiders will use
that information in regulatory decisionmaking.9 The easiest way for
upper-level agency decisionmakers to implement this approach is to
promulgate policies requiring government scientists to obtain upperlevel approval before releasing scientific findings to Congress or the
public. They can avoid censorship criticism by claiming that
preapproval is necessary to ensure that the agency speaks with “one
voice.”10 For example, the Inspector General of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) concluded that
from 2004–06, the agency’s Office of Public Affairs had “managed the
topic of climate change in a manner that reduced, marginalized or
mischaracterized climate change science made available to the general
public” and that politics were “inextricably interwoven” into the
agency’s pronouncements in a way that violated NASA’s basic
charter.11 Similarly, during the Trump administration, the Department
of the Interior (“DOI”) required news releases on scientific studies
undertaken by the U.S. Geological Service (“USGS”) to undergo a
“policy review” by nonscientist upper-level officials in the
Department.12
9. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696 (noting that political appointees have “prevented
federal scientists from publicly sharing their research and expertise”).
10. See, e.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN
POLICYMAKING, app. B at 39 (Mar. 2004) (describing a Department of Agriculture directive that
required staff scientists to seek approval prior to publishing any research or speaking publicly on
“sensitive issues,” a term that included “[a]gricultural practices with negative health and
environmental consequences”); Susan Okie, Tensions Between CDC, White House; Health
Officials Say Low Morale Could Threaten Agency’s Ability to Handle Crises, WASH. POST, July
1, 2002, at A15 (indicating communications between scientists in the Centers for Disease Control
and the public were closely monitored by policymakers in the Department of Health and Human
Services during the George W. Bush administration); Andrew C. Revkin, Cheney’s Office Said to
Edit Draft Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at A12 (reporting that Vice President Dick
Cheney’s office and the White House Council on Environmental Quality sought deletions of
sections of draft congressional testimony).
11. Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Office Is Criticized on Climate Change Reports, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2008, at A16.
12. Dino Grandoni & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Official Said Scientists Went “Beyond Their
Wheelhouse” by Writing Climate Change “Dramatically” Shrank Glaciers, WASH. POST (Mar. 7,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/03/07/trump-officialsaid-scientists-went-outside-their-wheelhouse-by-writing-climate-change-dramatically-shrunkmontana-glaciers [https://perma.cc/2ZQV-Q2JG]. In one case, the Department’s Assistant
Secretary for Insular Affairs objected to a USGS press release stating that climate change had
“dramatically reduced” glaciers in Montana in connection with a study showing that thirty-nine
glaciers in Montana had diminished in size by as much as 85 percent since 1966. Id.
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Another strategy is to prevent the staff from releasing staffprepared reports that are likely to stimulate demands for regulatory
action. For example, an unnamed Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) official reported in July 2018 that political appointees at the
agency, including a former consultant to the chemical industry, were
indefinitely delaying the release of a completed draft of a risk
assessment that contained a troubling conclusion: the widely used
chemical formaldehyde posed a risk to human beings of contracting
leukemia and other diseases at exposure levels typically encountered
in buildings in which formaldehyde-treated wood was present.13 The
EPA official reported that upper-level political appointees were
avoiding creating a record of their activities by eschewing written
memos and emails and relying on “a children’s game of telephone.”14
Officials in agencies that fund scientific research can ensure that
policy-relevant scientific questions remain unanswered by failing to
write grants for projects aimed at answering those questions or
canceling existing grants.15 In August 2017, for example, the DOI’s
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSMRE”)
ordered the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to halt all work
on a study that it had almost completed on the health risks posed by
mountaintop removal mining operations to residents of nearby
communities.16 OSMRE had commissioned the NAS study toward the
end of the Obama administration to evaluate several epidemiological
studies concluding that such operations caused cancer and birth defects
and to suggest new approaches to reducing those health risks.17 The
DOI’s Office of Inspector General concluded that OSMRE had wasted
almost $500,000 that it had already spent on the never-completed

13. Annie Snider, Sources: EPA Blocks Warnings on Cancer-Causing Chemical, POLITICO
(July 6, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/06/epa-formaldehyde-warningsblocked-696628 [https://perma.cc/H98N-LW3Y].
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Department’s Political Grant Screening Could Get Tricky, E&E
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060070789 [https://perma.cc/
74LX-LNK5] (reporting on the Trump administration’s new Interior policy of subjecting grants
to universities above $50,000 to review by politically appointed Department officials to “better
align” the grants with the Trump Administration’s “priorities”).
16. Phil McKenna, Trump Admin. Halts Mountaintop Mining Health Risks Study by
National Academies, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 21, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/21082017/mountaintop-mining-coal-health-study-scrapped-trump [https://perma.cc/G5C83RC6].
17. Id.
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study.18 In addition, the decision blocked the NAS from illuminating
these risks for the general public and decisionmakers in other agencies.
Upper-level officials can prevent agency scientists from sharing
their research with other scientists and the public by denying
permission to publish their scientific conclusions in scientific journals
and by withholding funds for attending scientific meetings. For
example, upper-level officials at the Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) and the USGS in October 2017 refused to allow scientists
from those agencies to make presentations at a conference on the role
that climate change plays in causing conditions conducive to the spread
of wildfires, information of obvious relevance to the public and
decisionmakers attempting to deal with wildfires throughout the
West.19
Finally, in the age of the internet, political appointees have
influenced how their agencies communicate with the public by deleting
information from agency websites. Early in the Trump administration,
political appointees at EPA removed the climate change website that
the agency had been curating for twenty years.20 The website reflected
the conclusion of EPA’s scientists that emissions of greenhouse gases
contributed to climate disruption.21 EPA’s public affairs office
explained that the Agency was “updating” the website to reflect its new
priorities, but as of late September 2018, the update was nowhere to be
found.22 A former EPA employee, who had been responsible for the
website, complained that “one of the world’s best climate science sites
has vanished.”23 At the same time, several other agencies were—

18. Letter from Mary L. Kendall, Deputy Inspector General, DOI, to Raul M. Grijalva,
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Natural Resources (June 7, 2018).
19. Brittany Patterson, Govt. Scientist Blocked from Talking About Climate and Fire, E&E
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/10/31/stories/1060065143
[https://perma.cc/EU6Y-4DPD]; see also David Willman, Risk Was Known as FDA OKd Fatal
Drug, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at A1 (reporting FDA officials prevented agency scientist from
discussing the scientific information relevant to the risk that the diabetes drug Rezulin caused
liver damage).
20. Jason Samenow, I Worked on the EPA’s Climate Change Website. Its Removal is a
Declaration of War, WASH. POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/iworked-on-the-epas-climate-change-website-its-removal-is-a-declaration-of-war/2017/06/22/735f
0858-5697-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html [https://perma.cc/F54G-B3UW].
21. Id.
22. Id. A Google search for “EPA Climate Change” yields a page on the EPA website
stating, “[w]e want to help you find what you are looking for. You can view an archived version
of this content on the January 19, 2017, snapshot.” Help Finding Information, EPA (July 23, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/signpost/cc.html [https://perma.cc/7U7V-CL7K].
23. Samenow, supra note 20. Several cities have posted an archived version of the EPA
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presumably at the direction of new management—making scientific
data related to climate change less accessible on their websites.24
2. Limiting Scientific Input. Another strategy for achieving stealth
deregulation is to sideline science by diluting, limiting, or even ignoring
input from the agency’s scientific and technical staff. During the
Reagan administration, the head of the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) effectively diluted the input of agency scientists and scientific
advisory committees by allowing scientists and other advocates from
pharmaceutical companies to play a larger role in determining how
their drugs were developed, marketed, and advertised than in previous
administrations.25
Although the White House touted the need for “sound science” in
environmental decisionmaking at the outset of the George W. Bush
administration, it nonetheless consistently ignored the advice of
independent scientific bodies in formulating its global warming
policies.26 For example, in early June 2002, an EPA-chaired federal
task force published the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002 laying out the
scientific basis for its conclusion that anthropogenic greenhouse
emissions contributed to global warming.27 It predicted that continued
increases would “very likely” have severely disruptive effects in the
United States.28 President Bush, however, dismissed the report as
something that had been “put out by the bureaucracy.”29 The Director
climate change page on their websites, but they are not being updated. Id.
24. See Coral Davenport, How Much Has ‘Climate Change’ Been Scrubbed from Federal
Websites? A Lot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/climate/climate
-change-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4APS-HNSF]; Juliet Eilperin, Under Trump, Inconvenient
Data Is Being Sidelined, WASH. POST (May 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
under-trump-inconvenient-data-is-being-sidelined/2017/05/14/3ae22c28-3106-11e7-8674-437ddb6
e813e_story.html [https://perma.cc/M9YM-JQ87].
25. PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS AND ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 216–17 (2003).
26. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at F1.
27. Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Sees Problems in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at
A1.
28. Id.
29. Katherine Q. Seelye, President Distances Himself from Global Warming Report, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A19. Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act from
the Cheney energy task force showed that Bush administration officials had been closely
following the report for months prior to its appearance on the internet. See ROBERT S. DEVINE,
BUSH VERSUS THE ENVIRONMENT 176 (2004). In an email to Phil Cooney, the Chief of Staff of
the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the head of the Competitive Enterprise
Institute (“CEI”), an industry-supported think tank, had promised to help “drive a wedge
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of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(“OSTP”) later assured an appropriations subcommittee that the EPA
report did not represent official administration policy.30 And EPA took
little action during the Bush administration to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.31
After Dr. Andrew Mosholder, a staff scientist at the FDA during
the George W. Bush administration, combined the data from published
and unpublished studies into a large “meta-analysis” of the suicidal
side effects of FDA-approved antidepressants, his analysis showed that
children given the drugs were almost twice as likely to become suicidal
as children on placebos.32 Although high-level FDA officials had
originally agreed to allow Dr. Mosholder to present his findings at a
meeting of the external scientific advisory committee charged with
reviewing the relevant studies and making recommendations to the
agency, they changed their minds.33 The science advisory committee
therefore did not hear from Dr. Mosholder or review his internal
report.34
3. Safety in Models. Many public health and environmental rules
rest, in part, on analyses supported by computational models. Models
are useful in this context because they synthesize a great deal of
information in a rigorous and consistent way—and do so quickly. But
models are by no means perfect. Because so little is known about
mechanisms of toxicity for most chemicals, for example, chemical risk
assessment models are necessarily premised on a variety of
assumptions that often cannot be validated with experimental data. For

between the President and those in the administration who think that they are serving the
President’s best interests by pushing this rubbish.” Myron Ebell, White House Effect, HARPER’S
MAG., May 2004, at 26.
30. White House Promises to Limit Legitimacy of EPA Climate Assessment, INSIDE EPA
(Mar. 7, 2003), https://insideepa.com/inside-epa/white-house-promises-limit-legitimacy-epaclimate-assessment [https://perma.cc/6TKZ-994X].
31. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ
FAIRE REVIVAL 108 (2013).
32. Elizabeth Shogren, FDA Sat on Report Linking Suicide, Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004,
at A13; see also Gardiner Harris, Antidepressants Restudied for Relation to Child Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2004, at N20 (“Dr. Mosholder concluded that children given antidepressants were
almost twice as likely as those given placebos to become suicidal.”).
33. See, e.g., Shogren, supra note 32 (discussing the FDA officials’ decision to change plans
regarding Dr. Mosholder’s presentation to the FDA advisory committee).
34. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 32; Shogren, supra note 32.
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that reason, experts in modeling concede that “all models are wrong,
but some are useful.”35
From the standpoint of a deregulatory president swimming against
both legal and political tides, however, an analytical tool that provides
so much scientific leeway and, at the same time, appears technical and
esoteric offers a clear pathway for reversing course. A political
appointee can slip behind the technocratic curtain and tweak model
inputs, assumptions, outputs, and interpretations in ways that
withstand public and even scientific scrutiny, but are in fact nothing
more than raw politics and ends-oriented decisionmaking.36
President Reagan’s political appointees pioneered many of the
modeling maneuvers that are still in use today to advance a
deregulatory agenda. Rather than advertise these changes as necessary
to advance the goal of deregulation, however, they portrayed the
modeling maneuvers as differences in scientific judgments.37 The
Reagan administration’s efforts to protect the formaldehyde industry
from regulation illustrate some of the techniques refined during that
era. By the late 1970’s, the profitable production of formaldehyde was
put at risk by a series of scientific studies reporting on the
carcinogenicity of formaldehyde in mice, rats, and humans.38 Departing
from its long-established assumptions for conducting carcinogen
modeling, EPA concluded that there were insufficient data on the risks
of formaldehyde to humans to provide a scientific justification for
regulating formaldehyde.39 At the same time, the Occupational Safety
35. GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND
RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987).
36. See generally Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, Misunderstanding
Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293 (2010)
(describing, among the challenges of using models for regulation, the political manipulation of
models).
37. See, e.g., MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER POLICY 175 (1986) (describing the
“political use of science” during the Reagan Administration); Nicholas A. Ashford, C. William
Ryan & Charles C. Caldart, A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A Departure
from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 328 (1983) (describing EPA’s
decision to not regulate formaldehyde under Reagan as one reached “long before any
‘decisionmaking process’ had been completed”); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation,
and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 96 (1988) (concluding similarly that social
policies and values adopted by agencies under the Reagan administration which lead to greater
risks were typically not “made explicit nor applied in a consistent manner”); Eliot Marshall,
EPA’s High-Risk Carcinogen Policy, 218 SCIENCE 975, 975 (1982) (quoting then-Representative
Albert Gore, Jr. who similarly criticized the Reagan administration’s tendency to use science to
justify political decisions to relax regulatory standards in order to reduce the burden on industry).
38. Ashford et al., supra note 37, at 327–28.
39. Id. at 326–28; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-216, app. B at 108 (1983). After President
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and Health Administration (“OSHA”) administrator appointed by
President Reagan rejected a labor union petition for an emergency
standard for formaldehyde supported by a substantial technical
bulletin by OSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (“NIOSH”) as well as a scientific consultant report by
researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.40 Both
reports concluded that workers were at risk and additional controls
were needed to protect workers.41 In rejecting the petition, the new,
deregulatory administrator relied on two in-house evaluations that
were prepared after he had taken office—one drawing heavily on the
industry’s analysis of the available evidence and the other an internal
assessment that was “prepared in written form sometime after” the
administrator’s actual decision to reject the labor petition.42 As
detailed by Dr. Ashford and coauthors, the administrator’s decision
rejecting the petition “depart[ed] from prevailing scientific opinion”
and diverged from the agency’s own generic cancer policy for
conducting risk assessments.43
Appointees of President George W. Bush continued the Reagan
administration’s tradition of manipulating modeling to achieve
deregulatory results.44 In assessing the risks of mercury emissions from
power plants, for example, an EPA Assistant Administrator instructed
staff to run the models in different ways until one of them produced an
outcome that was consistent with the administration’s “Clear Skies”
legislative initiative.45
Reagan replaced Administrator Anne Gorsuch with Bill Ruckelshaus following a series of
scandals at the agency, Ruckelshaus agreed with the staff that formaldehyde did present a major
health risk and should be regulated. Formaldehyde; Determination of Significant Risk, 49 Fed.
Reg. 21,870, 21,874 (May 23, 1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 765) (“EPA has determined
that by its 1976 criteria there is sufficient evidence to conclude that formaldehyde is a potential
carcinogen in humans.”).
40. Ashford et al., supra note 37, at 346–47, 348.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 349–50, 353 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 351.
44. See Linda Greer & Rena Steinzor, Bad Science, 19 ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 28, 34
(outlining how EPA’s risk assessment for vinyl chloride contained methodological errors, such as
ignoring studies that covered cancers other than liver cancers).
45. Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Accused of a Predetermined Finding on Mercury, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2005, at A16; Jennifer 8. Lee, White House Downplayed the Risks of Mercury in Proposed
Rules, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at 7A; John Shiffman & John Sullivan, EPA’s
Court Follies Sow Doubt, Delay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 8, 2008, at A1; Shankar Vedantam, EPA
Distorted Mercury Analysis, GAO Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A9. In an opinion that
found EPA’s logic comparable to that of the Queen of Hearts in Lewis Carroll’s Through the
Looking Glass, the D.C. Circuit in 2008 vacated the regulations, but the court did not reference
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The George W. Bush administration took the effort to a new level
when its Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) drafted “risk
assessment” guidelines aimed at regularizing all agency assessment
practices across all regulatory agencies.46 When the proposed
guidelines became controversial, OIRA requested that the NAS
review them.47 Noting that the project itself departed from scientific
practice by attempting to create a one-size-fits-all template for risk
assessment models,48 the NAS’s evaluation underscored how OIRA’s
guidelines were poised to slow down the already ossified risk
assessments process and to move the agencies from protective
endpoints towards more centralized estimates of risk.49 The NAS
report substantially reined in this initiative, producing final guidelines
that were considerably less prescriptive.50
The Trump administration appears to be continuing many of these
model maneuvers. But it is also innovating new techniques. One of the
most creative is EPA’s “transparency” proposal that would, inter alia,
require staff to go through a long punch list of alternative assumptions
and model runs for every regulatory initiative.51 There is no
explanation in the proposal of the scientific appropriateness of these
requirements, why this resource-intensive and time-consuming
exercise is being required, or how the requirements dovetail with
existing agency practices. Still more significant is the proposal’s open
invitation to private parties to create alternative risk assessment
the machinations of the Assistant Administrator and White House officials. New Jersey v. EPA,
517 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
46. See generally Sally Katzen, OMB, Memorandum for Regulatory Working Group,
Principles for Risk Assessment (Jan. 12, 1995), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/jan1995_risk_analysis_principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RK22-99ZP].
47. Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083,
1084 (2007).
48. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT
BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET 1 (2007).
49. Id. at 6–8.
50. See generally Memorandum from Susan E. Dudley, Adm’r, Office of Mgmt., & Budget
& Sharon L. Hays, Assoc. Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies
(Sept. 19, 2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/
m07-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7TW-XR6G].
51. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768, 18,774 (Apr. 30,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30). The list of generically imposed requirements includes,
among other things, “clearly explain[ing] the scientific basis for each model assumption used and
present[ing] analyses showing the sensitivity of the modeled results to alternative assumptions.”
Id. at 18,774 (emphasis added).
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models, along with a requirement in the proposal that the agency “give
explicit consideration” to all of these private models.52 By inundating
the agency with dozens of models for a particular regulatory project
and forcing EPA to extract and evaluate the dozens and often
hundreds of underlying assumptions and algorithms buried in each
model, private parties can slow the staff’s progress to a crawl. Whatever
signals might have been produced by several high quality, rigorously
vetted agency models are at risk of being lost in the cacophonous noise
of unlimited, unrestricted industry-created models.
4. Studying Rather than Acting and Raising the Burden of Proof.
President Reagan originated the “study-rather-than-act” move.53 This
tactic forestalls government action by highlighting scientific
uncertainties in the underlying scientific research, while waiting until
more research can be undertaken to reduce those uncertainties.54 In
the context of precautionary statutes, this has the practical effect of
raising the burden of proof with respect to facts that must be grounded
in the rulemaking record. It also puts off regulatory action while
scientists conduct additional research and the agency staff incorporates
the new research into relevant rulemaking documents. During the
early years of the Reagan administration, upper-level political
appointees in EPA invoked the need for “Good Science” to demand
hard proof that a pollutant was harming human health or damaging the
environment before it was willing to take protective action.55 Some
scientists outside the agency saw this as a “‘covert’ attempt to radically
revise and soften regulations.”56
This tactic continued into the George W. Bush administration.
Despite hundreds of studies and reports demonstrating that emissions

52. Id. Unlike the agency’s modeling practices, the private parties submitting alternative
models are not bound by any transparency requirements. Id.
53. See, e.g., JONATHAN LASH, A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S
ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 131 (1984).
54. Jonathan Foley & Christine Arena, How to Defeat Those Who are Waging War on
Science, SCI. AM. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/how-to-defeatthose-who-are-waging-war-on-science [https://perma.cc/2D8G-QKCJ] (noting that “[t]he
systematic use of so-called ‘uncertainty’ surrounding well-established scientific ideas has proven
to be a reliable method for manipulating public perception and stalling political action”).
55. LASH, supra note 53, at 131; Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives,
and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1662 & n.40 (1991) (“[T]here is abundant evidence
that administrators [of EPA under Reagan] frequently chose to ‘study’ uncertain issues as a way
to avoid resolving them.”).
56. LASH, supra note 53, at 149 (citations omitted).
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of “greenhouse gasses,” such as carbon dioxide, were causing global
temperatures to rise at an alarming rate, the George W. Bush
administration decided to delay any action to reduce those emissions
pending further study.57 The administration, however, went a step
further to edit the technical reports on climate change released by the
government.58 At least two reports were edited by Philip Cooney, an
attorney who had worked for the American Petroleum Institute
immediately before joining the White House.59 As one expert put it,
“The dozens of changes [made by Cooney], while sometimes as subtle
as the insertion of the phrase ‘significant and fundamental’ before the
word ‘uncertainties,’ tend[ed] to produce an air of doubt about findings
that most climate experts say are robust.”60 In February 2003, a panel
assembled by the NAS criticized the edited draft, finding that it lacked
“a guiding vision, executable goals, clear timetables and criteria for
measuring progress.”61 More important, the plan contemplated
research aimed at resolving scientific uncertainties in areas where most
uncertainties had already been resolved.62 Only a few months after the
media reported on Cooney’s role in editing the reports, he left his
position as chief of staff to the White House Council on Environmental
Quality to work for the Exxon Corporation.63
Perhaps the best example of the study-rather-than-act strategy is
EPA’s decades-long equivocation over the toxic effects of the pesticide
chlorpyrifos (also known as Dursban or Lorsban) on fetuses, infants
and children. The most heavily used of the class of “organophosphate”
insecticides, chlorpyrifos is a potent neurotoxin that is closely related
to the chemical warfare agent sarin.64 In the years after Dow Chemical
Company (“Dow”) received a registration in 1965, it became one of
57. DEVINE, supra note 29, at 175.
58. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at A1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Andrew C. Revkin, Panel of Experts Faults Bush Plan to Study Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2003, at A1.
62. Whitman Defends Climate Research Plan Against NAS Criticism, INSIDE EPA (Feb. 28,
2003),
https://insideepa.com/inside-epa/whitman-defends-climate-research-plan-against-nascriticism [https://perma.cc/4RM9-4AFQ]. According to one panel member, “[i]n some areas it’s
as if these people were not cognizant of the existing science.” Revkin, supra note 61.
63. Andrew C. Revkin, Ex-Bush Aide Who Edited Climate Reports to Join ExxonMobil,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at A13.
64. Roni Caryn Rabin, E.P.A. Lags on Pesticide Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2017, at D1;
Sharon Lerner, Poison Fruit, INTERCEPT (Jan. 14, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/01/14/dow
-chemical-wants-farmers-to-keep-using-a-pesticide-linked-to-autism-and-adhd [https://perma.cc/
RU4M-ZNJC].
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the most heavily used pesticides in the country.65 Its registrations for
home use, however, were voluntarily cancelled in 2000 after poison
control centers in the United States received reports of more than 7,000
acute poisonings attributable to chlorpyrifos.66
The ban of chlorpyrifos for home use came at an opportune time
for an epidemiological study undertaken by Dr. Virginia Rauh at
Columbia University’s Center for Children’s Environmental Health.
The study catalogued the effects of home use pesticides on 725 AfricanAmerican and Dominican mothers and their children living in New
York City.67 The ban allowed the researchers to compare babies who
had been exposed to the higher levels of chlorpyrifos in their homes
before the ban with those who had been exposed to the virtually
nonexistent levels after the ban.68 The results were startling. Babies
who were exposed to greater levels of the pesticide were on average
smaller than, weighed less at ages two and three than, and did not react
as well to stimuli as the babies who were exposed to less chlorpyrifos.69
And the dose-related disparities persisted for many years.70 As time
went on, the highly exposed children lagged in motor and mental
development.71 At age seven, the highly exposed children had lower
IQs and higher working memory deficits.72 Another study of urban
children by epidemiologists at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York
observed similar effects.73 Meanwhile, a study conducted by University
of California at Berkeley epidemiologists of the effects of chlorpyrifos
on mothers and children near agricultural operations in California
where chlorpyrifos was heavily used found that highly exposed children
had lower IQs and poorer cognitive functions than less exposed
children.74 Published in 2014, the study also found that the children of
women who lived near the fields during their pregnancies had
significantly higher autism rates.75
65. Lerner, supra note 64.
66. Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,080, 69,082 (Nov. 6, 2015)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180); Lerner, supra note 64.
67. Rabin, supra note 64, at D1; Lerner, supra note 64.
68. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
69. Lerner, supra note 64.
70. Rabin, supra note 64, at D1; Lerner, supra note 64.
71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Studies on laboratory animals lent credence to the epidemiological studies. Dr.
Theodore Slotkin, a scientist at the Duke University Medical Center, published dozens of papers
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Several environmental and public health groups had filed a lawsuit
in 2007 asking the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to order EPA to
come to a decision on their longstanding petition to cancel the
remaining registrations for chlorpyrifos and to withdraw the
“tolerances” that it had established setting permissible levels of
chlorpyrifos on food crops.76 After EPA studied the matter for another
seven years, the court ordered it to respond to the petition by the end
of October 2015.77 On October 28, 2015, EPA, working under President
Obama, proposed to revoke all of the tolerances for chlorpyrifos,
having concluded that the existing scientific information did not
support a conclusion, required by the 1996 Food Quality Protection
Act (“FQPA”), that aggregate exposures to that pesticide from food
and drinking water at the existing tolerances presented a “reasonable
certainty [of] no harm” to human beings.78 The statute in fact required
EPA to pay special attention to the risks that pesticides posed to
fetuses, infants, and children by employing an additional safety factor
to ensure that they would not be harmed by aggregate exposures to
pesticides.79 In support of its assessment, EPA cited “a considerable
and still-growing body of literature on the effects of chlorpyrifos on the
developing brain of laboratory animals (rats and mice) indicating that
gestational and/or postnatal exposure may cause persistent behavioral
effects into adulthood.”80 The proposal noted the uncertainties that
epidemiological studies encountered in obtaining accurate exposure
measures and in controlling for confounding factors.81 The Agency

detailing the effects of chlorpyrifos on very young rats. He observed a clear cause–effect
relationship between exposure and structural abnormalities, behavioral problems, and impaired
cognitive function. Even at “exquisitely low doses,” the chemical prevented cells from dividing
properly. Rabin, supra note 64.
76. Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,080, 69,083 (Nov. 6, 2015)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180).
77. In re Pesticide Action Network of N. Am. v. EPA, 798 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2015).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012); 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,080. For food uses, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act incorporates the Food Quality Protection
Act’s “reasonable certainty [of] no harm” test for determining whether to allow a pesticide’s
registration to remain in effect. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb); see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A tolerance qualifies as safe if the Administrator has
determined that there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C).
80. 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,090. Although there was some variability among the studies,
“behavioral changes of some sort were reported in most studies.” Id.
81. Id. at 69,091.
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concluded, however, that the studies presented “evidence of delays in
mental development in infants (24–36 months), attention problems and
autism spectrum disorder in early childhood, and intelligence
decrements in school age children who were exposed to chlorpyrifos or
OPs during gestation.”82 Given the uncertainties, the agency elected to
apply the full statutory ten-fold additional safety factor to protect
children.83 EPA’s pesticide Scientific Advisory Panel (“SAP”) agreed
with this assessment.84 And dozens of scientists, doctors, and public
health professionals also supported the proposal.85
The court granted extensions until March 2017 to finalize the
proposal, but made it clear to the Obama administration that no
further extensions would be forthcoming.86 At this point, Dow
employed a “science-for-hire” consulting company to conduct further
studies on chlorpyrifos and to deconstruct the new epidemiological
studies.87 The consultants demanded that Professor Rauh allow them
and EPA to examine the medical records of the subjects of the
Columbia study so that they could determine the validity of her
statistics. She declined on the ground that access to the data would
allow the company to determine the identities of the subjects and their
medical histories, a revelation that would violate her team’s promise to
protect their privacy.88 She was willing to let EPA see the raw data, but
she was unwilling to let Dow’s consultants invade the privacy of her
subjects.89 After meeting with Rauh and her team in 2014 to discuss
questions they had about the study, the EPA’s scientists were satisfied
that they did not need to examine the original files for the subjects.90

82. Id. at 69,093.
83. Id. at 69,095.
84. Id. at 69,090.
85. Brady Dennis, Trump EPA Declines to Ban Pesticide that Obama had Proposed
Outlawing, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environ
ment/wp/2017/03/29/trump-epa-declines-to-ban-pesticide-that-obama-had-proposed-outlawing
[https://perma.cc/HA3G-9AEA].
86. In re Pesticide Action Network of N. Am. v. EPA, 840 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2016);
Chlorpyrifos; Tolerance Revocations; Notice of Data Availability and Request for Comment, 81
Fed. Reg. 81,049, 81,0151 (proposed Nov. 17, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180).
87. Lerner, supra note 64.
88. Id.
89. Corbin Hiar, Agency Follows Industry Playbook to Attack Science, E&E NEWS (Aug. 23,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060095095 [https://perma.cc/SY6T-SFLE]; Lerner, supra
note 64.
90. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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In November 2016, EPA published a notice stating that it had
reevaluated the risk assessment underlying the 2015 proposed
revocation in light of comments from the SAP.91 It agreed with the
panel that the Columbia study was scientifically reliable and that it
should not rely on that study’s cord blood data as the point of departure
for determining a level of exposure that would give rise to a reasonable
certainty of no harm.92 At the SAP’s suggestion, EPA reestimated peak
exposures in a new risk assessment, which ultimately demonstrated
that chlorpyrifos exposures from food and drinking water at the
existing tolerances did not meet the statute’s “reasonable certainty [of]
no harm” test.93 The Agency invited further public comment on the
revised risk assessment.94
After the 2016 election, Dow was in an ideal position to influence
upper-level decisionmakers at EPA. One of its lobbyists served on the
EPA transition team, which was headed by an employee of a think tank
that had received monetary support from Dow.95 And President Trump
appointed Dow’s CEO, Andrew Liveris, to be the head of an advisory
committee for the Department of Commerce (“DOC”) called the
American Manufacturing Council.96
Several days after a private meeting with Liveris, EPA
Administrator Pruitt formally denied all aspects of the environmental
groups’ petition.97 Pruitt decided to ignore the many studies showing
developmental neurotoxicity at exposure levels lower than the existing
tolerances because the issue of the neurodevelopmental toxicity of
organophospate pesticides “was, and remains, an issue at the cutting
edge of science, involving significant uncertainties.”98 The industry
comments on the 2015 proposal demonstrated “deep disagreement”
over how the recent animal and epidemiological studies “should be
considered in the EPA’s risk assessment.”99 Pruitt therefore concluded

91. 81 Fed. Reg. 81,049.
92. Id. at 81,050.
93. Id. at 81,051.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Chlorpyrifos; Order Denying PANNA and NRDC’s Petition to Revoke Tolerances,
82 Fed. Reg. 16,581, 16,583 (Apr. 5, 2017); Pruitt Met with Dow CEO Before Rejecting Pesticide
Ban, E&E NEWS (June 28, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/06/28/stories
/1060056731 [https://perma.cc/QT5Y-2DW7] (meeting with Liveris).
98. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 16,590.
99. Id.
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that “the science on this question is not resolved and would likely
benefit from additional inquiry.”100 In addition, Pruitt thought that it
might be advisable to “seek additional authoritative peer review” of
the EPA’s risk assessment before finalizing it.101 Although the benefits
of the pesticide were irrelevant under the FQPA, Pruitt nevertheless
thought it was “important to recognize that for many decades
chlorpyrifos has been and remains one of the most widely used
pesticides in the United States.”102 Pruitt thus decided to deny the
petitions and continue to study chlorpyrifos until the next
reregistration deadline in 2022.103
In a statement for the press, Pruitt explained that the Trump
administration was “returning to using sound science in decisionmaking – rather than predetermined results.”104 In reality, however, he
was doing just the opposite, and he was doing so in violation of the
statute under which he was acting. Documents produced in response to
a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request showed that Pruitt’s
political staff had pressured the agency’s scientific staff to write a final
regulation supporting Pruitt’s predetermined conclusion that the
chlorpyrifos tolerances should remain in effect.105 The recently retired
head of EPA’s chemical safety unit observed that Pruitt and his
politically appointed underlings were “ignoring the science that is
pretty solid,” and he predicted that farm workers and their children
would be put at risk for at least another four years.106
In August 2018, the Ninth Circuit vacated Pruitt’s action and
ordered EPA to “revoke all tolerances and cancel all registrations for
chlorpyrifos within 60 days.”107 Contrary to Pruitt’s statements about
using sound science to support his decision, the court found that EPA

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Since EPA had already canceled the pesticide registrations for chlorpyrifos home
uses, withdrawing the tolerances for all of its food uses would have the practical effect of removing
it from the market.
103. See id.
104. Eric Lipton, E.P.A. Chief Won’t Ban Insecticide Thought To Be Risky, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
30, 2017, at A21.
105. Eric Lipton & Roni Caryn Rabin, In Memos, E.P.A. Vowed New Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2017, at A13.
106. Lipton, supra note 104; New EPA Rule Puts Some Kids at Autism Risk, E&E NEWS (Apr.
4, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/04/04/stories/1060052559 [https://perma.cc/
ZG9X-HGVY] (noting that the rule “could affect the mostly Hispanic children of undocumented
immigrants who live near the farms where they work to pick the pesticide-covered produce”).
107. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 832 (9th Cir. 2018).
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did not even attempt to defend the denial of the petition on its scientific
merits.108 Instead, it relied on procedural and jurisdictional arguments,
which the court rejected.109 Professor Dan Farber observed that
“Pruitt’s invocation of ‘sound science’ as a way of ignoring all the
scientific evidence shows the hollowness of that anti-regulatory buzz
phrase.”110
5. Rewriting Reports Relevant to Regulatory Issues. Agencies often
draft or commission reports on scientific issues that they later rely upon
in setting agency priorities or in regulatory initiatives addressed to
particular products or activities. Because such reports do not always
receive widespread public attention (and sometimes cannot even be
reached with FOIA requests),111 agency leaders can advance
deregulatory policies by manipulating the science that goes into those
reports.112 Having altered the scientific record, the policies are much
easier to justify.
The oil and gas industry was undoubtedly pleased by a longawaited draft report on the environmental risks posed by hydraulic
fracturing (“fracking”) technologies that EPA published in June 2015
under President Obama.113 The report’s bottom line conclusion was
that while there were “specific instances where one or more
mechanisms led to impacts on drinking water resources,” the existing
studies did not indicate “widespread, systemic impacts on drinking

108. See id. at 828.
109. See id. at 829.
110. See Dan Farber, Trump Loses Another Big Court Case, LEGALPLANET (Aug. 13, 2018),
http://legal-planet.org/2018/08/13/trump-loses-another-big-court-case [https://perma.cc/UHM3ZGES].
111. WENDY WAGNER, REPORT FOR ACUS: SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF
AGENCY DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 116–18 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/N5MX-PHEV] [hereinafter WAGNER, ACUS STUDY].
112. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696 (stating that public officials have “manipulated
scientific reports to help justify policy decisions”). For example, the White House Council on
Environmental Quality demanded such extensive changes in the chapter describing
anthropogenic climate change in EPA’s 2003 report on the state of the environment that thenEPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman decided to delete the chapter, rather than attempt
to defend it from the “severe criticism” that it would attract from the scientific community.
Andrew C. Revkin & Katherine Q. Seelye, White House Cuts Data on Warming in an E.P.A.
Report, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at A1
113. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES (External Review Draft
2015), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=244651 [https://perma.cc/T28M9B5S].
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water resources in the United States.”114 The industry and its allies in
Congress seized on the conclusion to support their contention that
fracking did not result in contaminated drinking water and therefore
did not need to be regulated by either EPA or the states.115
Environmental groups were mystified, because the body of the
report—which spotlighted many instances in which fracking operations
had in fact contaminated groundwater—did not seem to support its
upbeat conclusion.116 FOIA requests from news organizations later
revealed that the conclusion that fracking did not have “widespread
systemic” impacts on drinking water did not appear in the draft that
EPA scientists sent to the White House for interagency review.117
Instead, the draft had emphasized the fact that fracking had
contaminated drinking water in more than twenty instances in support
of its conclusion that EPA had identified “potential vulnerabilities” of
drinking water supplies to fracking.118 The conclusion regarding a lack
of “widespread systemic” effects did not appear in the report until after
several meetings between EPA officials, White House staff and highlevel officials in the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and DOI.119 A
former EPA official believed that the “widespread systemic” effects
statement was inserted by political appointees “to ensure that there
would not be blowback from the oil and gas industry.”120
114. Ellen M. Gilmer & Mike Soraghan, EPA Study Finds No “Widespread” Impact on
Drinking Water, E&E NEWS (June 4, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060019689
[https://perma.cc/94CZ-ZS7G].
115. Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Conflicted After Study Finds Contamination Not Widespread,
E&E NEWS (June 5, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/06/05/stories/1060019713
[https://perma.cc/Q4CA-YQRY] [hereinafter Gilmer, Enviros Conflicted]; Ellen M. Gilmer,
Lawmakers Spar Over EPA Study’s Bottom Line, E&E NEWS (June 4, 2015), https://www.ee
news.net/eenewspm/2015/06/04/stories/1060019698 [https://perma.cc/3FZ8-MRJN]; Myra P.
Saefong, Why Shale Producers Are Happy With this EPA Fracking Study, MARKETWATCH (June
11, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/shale-producers-are-thrilled-with-this-epa-frack
ing-study-2015-06-11 [https://perma.cc/8BLP-49SC].
116. Ellen M. Gilmer, Enviros Conflicted, supra note 115.
117. Tom Scheck & Scott Tong, EPA’s Late Changes to Fracking Study Downplayed Risk of
Polluted Drinking Water, APM REPORTS (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/
2016/11/29/world/epa-s-late-changes-fracking-study-portray-lower-pollution-risk
[https://
perma.cc/86TN-EMX2]; Mike Soraghan, White House Engaged in “Messaging” for EPA Fracking
Study, E&E News (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060043152 [https://
perma.cc/E4LV-HHVP].
118. See text accompanying supra note 117.
119. See text accompanying supra note 117.
120. Scheck & Tong, supra note 117 (quoting Dominic DiGiulio). After undertaking a
detailed review of the draft report, a panel of the agency’s Science Advisory Board concluded
that EPA had not “support[ed] quantitatively its conclusion about lack of evidence for
widespread, systemic impacts on drinking water resources.” U.S. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BOARD,
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During the Trump administration, politically appointed officials
even more aggressively amended staff scientific reports. Internal
documents obtained from the National Park Service (“NPS”) pursuant
to a FOIA request showed that upper-level officials had deleted every
reference to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as a cause of
climate change from a draft report on the risks that rising sea levels
posed to national parks.121 At the insistence of political appointees in
the White House, EPA’s staff removed passages highlighting the
dangers posed by power plant carbon dioxide emissions from the
regulatory impact assessment for the Trump administration’s proposed
rollback of the Obama administration’s regulations addressing
greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants.122 A Sierra Club
FOIA request yielded documents showing that upper-level political
appointees in the DOE changed a report being prepared by the
National Energy Technology Laboratory on the January 2018 “bomb
cyclone” cold wave to emphasize the benefits of coal-fired power
plants in a misleading fashion.123

SAB REVIEW OF THE EPA’S DRAFT ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, 2, EPA-SAB-16-005 (Aug.
2016). Because the data were insufficiently robust to support a quantitative analysis, EPA
scientists deleted the “widespread systemic” conclusion from the final version of the report. U.S.
EPA, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (Dec.
2016); Soraghan, supra note 117. The revised report found evidence that fracking contaminated
drinking water at all stages of the process. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Shifts on Fracking, Citing
Harm to Water, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2016, at A19.
121. Elizabeth Shogren, Wipeout: Human Role in Climate Change Removed from Science
Report, REVEAL (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/wipeout-human-role-inclimate-change-removed-from-science-report
[https://perma.cc/4FF9-6CPG].
After
the
censorship was reported in the trade press, the department reinserted references to human-caused
climate change in the final version of the report. Adam Aton, Researchers Say Sea-Level Report
Was Censored. Here It Is, E&E NEWS (May 21, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060082165
[https://perma.cc/2RAH-EKWS].
122. Zack Colman & Maxine Joselow, White House Cut Climate Warnings from Rule on
Power Plants, E&E NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060095807
[https://perma.cc/398K-ZZWF]; Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Dire Climate Change Warnings Cut from
Trump Power-Plant Proposal, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Sept. 4, 2018, 3:06 PM),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/dire-climate-changewarnings-cut-from-trump-power-plant-proposal [https://perma.cc/77YK-HS8T].
123. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Officials Helped Edit “Bomb Cyclone” Report to Boost Coal,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0809/trump-officials-helped-edit-bomb-cyclone-report-to-boost-coal
[https://perma.cc/MRH3MLJ4].
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6. Substituting Deregulatory Policy for Science. Perhaps the most
pervasive strategy for deregulation through science is for upper-level
political appointees to quietly substitute deregulatory policy for
science as they interact with staff scientists during the decisionmaking
process. Political appointees in the White House can also substitute
policy for science in nontransparent ways when agencies send drafts of
regulations to OIRA for review.
Upper-Level Agency Officials. Because the careers of staff
scientists and engineers depend on the assessments of upper-level
policymakers, they understandably feel pressure to accommodate the
desires of their superiors. When the desires of upper-level officials
conflict with professional norms, as, for example, when they suggest or
demand that scientists select models or interpret data to achieve
predetermined outcomes, it may be difficult for agency scientists and
engineers to resist.124 Politically appointed officials have frequently
overruled agency experts without providing credible reasons for doing
so.125 One of the most striking examples this phenomenon is the history
of EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for
fine particulate matter (“PM”) during the George W. Bush
administration. The administrator rejected a staff recommendation
that the Agency tighten the standard,126 even though the Agency’s
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (“CASAC”) had agreed with
the staff’s recommendation.127 To support this less protective standard,

124. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1601, 1603–17 (2008) (noting that the deputy secretary of the interior interfered with the
listing of and determination of critical habitat for several endangered species); 16 BNA,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REPORTER 1064 (1987) (noting that a career scientist
who chaired OSHA’s working group dealing with employee exposure to lead was threatened with
a letter charging her with insubordination if she did not write a provision that would relax the
permissible level for lead in the battery manufacturing industry in accordance with the agency
leadership’s policy preferences).
125. See Michael Hawthorne, EPA Chief Pruitt Overrules Staff, Gives Wisconsin’s Walker,
Foxconn Big Break on Smog, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 2018, 6:49 AM), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-smog-pruitt-foxconn-20180501-story.html [https://
perma.cc/RV5G-A57B] (noting that EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt “exempted most of
southeast Wisconsin from the latest federal limits on” air pollution, in order to benefit Foxconn’s
planned $410 billion project for a new manufacturing facility in the area); ENDANGERED SPECIES
COALITION, SUPPRESSED: HOW POLITICS DROWNED OUT SCIENCE FOR TEN ENDANGERED
SPECIES 3 (2017) (reporting many instances during the Trump administration where the DOI’s
Fish and Wildlife Service’s politically appointed leadership overruled its scientists “to please
special interests”).
126. See EPA Coarse Particle Decision Sets Stage for Major Legal Battle, RISK POL’Y REP.
(Sept. 26, 2006).
127. See EPA’s Particulate Rule Draws Only Criticism and Talk of Legal Challenge From All
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some rather substantial meddling in the Agency’s analysis was
necessary. Over the CASAC’s objections, EPA’s final analysis
dropped several key studies and included edits and opinions that had
not been internally reviewed.128 The Agency’s final analysis set aside
the staff’s concern about short-term exposures as premature and
unrealistic, and the studies supporting a short-term standard were
discounted.129 The administration’s portrayal of these decisions as
scientifically compelled sparked a sharp rebuke from the CASAC and
the scientific community. Dr. Rogene Henderson, the CASAC
chairwoman, told the press that most of the committee members were
“very disappointed” that the Administrator had not followed the
advice of the staff and the committee.130 Later, the committee sent a
strongly worded letter to the Administrator, stating that EPA’s
standard did not meet the statutory requirements131 and that, to the
committee’s knowledge, “no science, medical or public health group”
disagreed with CASAC’s assessment of the scientific record.132 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with several states and
environmental groups that several of EPA’s conclusions deviated
significantly enough from past agency practice, scientific advice
(particularly by CASAC), and the scientific record that they warranted
explanations, but EPA had provided none.133
In preparing the regulatory impact assessment (“RIA”) detailing
the costs and benefits of repealing the Obama administration’s Clean
Power Plan (“CPP”), EPA’s upper-level decisionmakers determined
that the RIA had overestimated the cobenefits of the reductions in PM
emissions that would result from controlling CO2 emissions because it
assumed that there was no level at which exposure to PM produced no
adverse effects in human beings.134 Yet their decision ignored the many
studies showing that PM exposures below the primary standard caused
Around, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK. (Sept. 25, 2006).
128. Advisers Decide to Clarify Call to EPA For Stricter Standard on Fine Particles, 37 ENVTL.
REP 285 (Feb. 10, 2006).
129. See Robert A. Michaels, Particulate Matter: The Marines, EPA, and Air Quality, 11 RISK
POL’Y REP. 34 (2004).
130. Janet Wilson, New EPA Rules on Soot and Dust Set, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at B1.
131. Advisory Panel Warns of Continued Risk Because of EPA’s Decision on Fine Particles,
37 ENVTL. REP. 2031 (Oct. 6, 2006).
132. Id.
133. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n. v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 521–23 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
134. Niina Heikkinen, To Kill Climate Rule, EPA Wants to Redefine Danger of Soot, E&E
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060092763 [https://perma.cc/V94RQEBR].
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adverse health effects in human beings.135 Indeed, two EPA scientists
were coauthors of a study published in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences in September 2018 showing that the mortality risk
of PM exposures at levels below the primary NAAQS was much higher
than previous studies suggested.136
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The literature on
centralized review of federal agency rulemaking is filled with examples
of officials in OIRA (an agency in the White House’s OMB)
substituting deregulatory policy for agency scientific conclusions.137
During the Reagan administration, OIRA made numerous,
nontransparent technical changes to EPA’s high-level radioactive
waste disposal rule and its ambient air quality standards for PM and to
OSHA’s occupational health and safety standards for ethylene oxide,
grain handling facilities and formaldehyde.138 President George H.W.
Bush’s OIRA rejected an agreement among the OSHA staff, industry,
and labor unions to lower the permissible exposure limit for
formaldehyde139 and disputed OSHA scientists’ assessment of the risks
to workers posed by cadmium.140 OIRA made a concerted effort during
the George W. Bush administration to increase its technical and
scientific capabilities in an attempt to gain deeper and broader control

135. Id.; see also Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: The Other Scientific Consensus The EPA is
Bucking, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/10/11/the-energy-202-the-other-scientificconsensus-the-epa-is-bucking/59dcff9230fb0468cea81e52/?utm_term=.4fe63051acb3
[https://perma.cc/PG8L-JU58].
136. Richard Burnett et al., Global Estimates of Mortality Associated with Long-Term
Exposure to Outdoor Fine Particulate Matter, 115 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCIENCES 9592 (2018); see also Scott Waldman, EPA Staff Co-Wrote Study Linking Emissions to
Death, E&E NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060096863 [https://perma.cc/
86ZU-BJW3] (“As EPA rolls back emissions regulations, its own researchers are part of a major
study that has found that global air pollution kills far more people than has previously been
revealed.”).
137. See Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to
Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1986) (describing how OMB employees with
little to no scientific background are making decisions that “involve scientific determinations”);
Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT.
RESOURCES L. 1, 64–73 (1984).
138. See generally Olson, supra note 137 (discussing EPA regulations); THOMAS O.
MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 83–88, 89–92, 110–11 (1992)
(describing changes made to OSHA health and safety standards).
139. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 159–60.
140. Id. at 168.

MCGARITY & WAGNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1746

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/25/2019 3:58 PM

[Vol. 68:1719

over the substance of agency rules.141 The OIRA staff used this
expanded authority quite aggressively to force EPA to drop a proposed
stringent secondary ambient air quality standard to protect crops from
photochemical oxidants, even though the agency’s CASAC had
recommended an even more stringent standard.142 EPA’s outraged
staff, who hastily rewrote the regulation’s preamble to justify the
change, called the change a matter of “pure politics.”143 The CASAC’s
chairwoman testified in a subsequent congressional hearing that
“[w]ilful ignorance” had “triumphed over sound science” in EPA’s
decisionmaking process.144 Ultimately, OIRA substituted deregulatory
policy for science in a number of other rulemaking initiatives during
the George W. Bush administration.145
OIRA’s aggressive interventions into agency rulemakings
continued into the Obama administration.146 For example, the
proposed regulations governing the disposal of coal combustion
residuals (“CCRs” or “coal ash”) that EPA forwarded to OIRA in
October 2009 would have characterized CCRs as hazardous wastes
subject to the stringent requirements of Subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.147 It based that determination on the
potential for toxic constituents to migrate from impoundments into
groundwater and on the need to avoid catastrophic spills.148 The OIRA

141. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the Regulatory
State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 968–69 (2005).
142. Erik Stokstad, EPA Adjusts a Smog Standard to White House Preference, 319 SCIENCE
1602–03 (2008); Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush’s Behest, WASH. POST (Mar. 14,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/13/AR2008031304175.ht
ml?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/5E2W-KEGW]; see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE:
POLICY ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 8-13, 8-25 (2007) (outlining
recent CASAC recommendations).
143. John Sullivan, Tom Avril & John Shiffman, Politics Choke Clean-Air Efforts, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/homepage/20081210_Scientists
_criticize_EPA_chief.html [https://perma.cc/2SUK-ZJ96].
144. EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 87 (2008) (statement of Rogene F. Henderson, Chairman,
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee). The D.C. Circuit later struck down the secondary
standard because EPA’s justification for it was inadequate, but the court did not mention OIRA’s
role. Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1358–62 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
145. Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with
Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2041–42 (2015)
146. Id. at 2042–45.
147. Charlotte E. Tucker, Original Draft Shows Coal-Ash Proposal Substantially Revised
During OMB Review, 41 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1061 (2010).
148. Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
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staff radically changed the content of the draft to provide a set of
options that included hazardous waste listing, but also contained two
far less stringent options.149 The draft RIA that emerged from OIRA
focused heavily on the “stigma” effects that listing CCRs as hazardous
wastes would have on the markets for recycling CCRs into concrete
and wallboard.150 Although EPA’s draft of the RIA did not attempt to
quantify the stigma effect, the OIRA version estimated that the stigma
affect alone would cost society $233.5 billion in lost recycled CCRs,
based on its unsupported assumption that 51 percent of the market for
recyclable CCRs would disappear.151 Not surprisingly, the final coal ash
regulations that EPA published in April 2014 did not characterize
CCRs as hazardous wastes, even though the staff had by then identified
at least 157 coal ash impoundments that had contaminated
groundwater or otherwise posed a substantial risk to health or the
environment.152 Instead of a federal regulatory program, the
regulations suggested minimum criteria for states to use in their waste
disposal programs, if they were so inclined.153
B. Adjusting Internal Resources and Procedures
Political appointees can delay or affect the outcomes of regulatory
initiatives by adjusting internal agency procedures to make it more
difficult for the staff to generate and use the science underlying those
initiatives. They can accomplish this by forcing the staff through
multiple time- and resource-consuming analytical exercises that are of
marginal relevance to the agency’s statutory responsibilities, cutting
the budgets and reducing the staff of the offices responsible for
providing scientific and engineering input into regulatory initiatives,
and changing organizational charts to render staff scientists and
engineers subject to supervision by political appointees. Presidents and
agency heads can also reduce the role that science plays in agency
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 260 (2012).
149. See id. at 261–62 (listing the options OIRA offered in its proposal); see also Tucker, supra
note 147 (outlining the changes from the original EPA version to the OMB proposal).
150. See Steinzor, supra note 148, at 265–66.
151. Id.
152. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion
Residuals from Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,302, 21,302, 21,325–26 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261) (announcing that CCRs will be disposed of “as solid waste
under subtitle D of RCRA [the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act],” rather than as
hazardous waste); see also Joby Warrick, EPA Imposes Coal-Ash Curbs But Stops Short of
‘Hazardous’ Designation, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2014, at A3.
153. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,303, 21,309.
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decisions by reducing the resources available to agency scientists,
making it more difficult for the staff to promulgate regulations, and
arranging decisionmaking procedures to ensure that the work product
of agency scientists is subject to review and modification by politically
appointed officials.
1. Cutting the Budgets for Technical Staff and Scientific Research.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to ensure that agency scientists
do not get in the way of deregulatory policy is simply to cut their
budgets. It would seem far easier to downsize scientific staff by
reducing the budget, rather than selecting out the most recalcitrant
scientists and firing them outright. In subsequent years, the upper-level
officials can, if necessary, seek increases in the budgets and bring in
scientists more to their liking. And, in a similar vein, if an outside body
like the agency’s Science Advisory Board produces a report that does
not fit a deregulatory narrative, administrations can cut off funds for
future reports.154 This strategy, of course, requires the cooperation of
Congress, and Congress may be reluctant to cut back on popular
regulatory programs. Even when unsuccessful, however, efforts by
administrations bent on deregulation to cut agency science budgets
sends a signal to government scientists that their contribution is not
valued.155
The Reagan White House was anxious to cut EPA’s research
budget for the simple reason that, in the words of White House
Counselor Edwin Meese, “all [research scientists] do is go out and find
more problems that need to be solved.”156 After a panel of experts
154. See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Trump Wants to Slash Funds for the Outside Experts Who Make
Sure EPA Gets the Science Right, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/04/trump-doesnt-just-want-to-cut-the-epasscience-he-wants-to-cut-its-expertise/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.193486e80300
[https://
perma.cc/L3M2-BQCK]. There is very little evidence of attempts by OIRA to substitute
deregulatory policy for science during the first two years of the Trump administration.
155. See Scott Waldman, Future Climate Scientists Concerned but Not Cowed by Trump, E&E
NEWS (May 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060054161/search?keyword
=+Future+Climate+Scientists+Concerned+by+not+Cowed+by+Trump [https://perma.cc/UFE79NTL] (discussing an interview with Christine McEntee, the CEO of the American Geophysical
Union, wherein “[s]he said the Trump administration’s proposed cuts to climate research has sent
a clear signal to scientists that their work is no longer valuable to the White House”).
156. ANNE M. BURFORD & JOHN GREENYA, ARE YOU TOUGH ENOUGH?:AN INSIDER’S
VIEW OF WASHINGTON’S POWER POLITICS 80 (1986); see also DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE
RAN LIKE WATER 108 (2002) (describing a scientist’s interaction with an OMB examiner where
the examiner responded to a request for funding by saying “Congress does not need to hear all
these details”). For descriptions of agency budget cuts and their effects during the Reagan
administration, see MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION
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assembled by the NAS reported in September 1981 that acid rain in the
Northeast was probably caused by emissions of sulfur dioxide and
oxides of nitrogen from power plants in the Midwest, the Reagan
administration cut off federal funds for a second report that would have
jointly reviewed the scientific information on acid rain with a panel of
the Royal Society of Canada in the hopes of reaching a consensus on
the relevant science for purposes of negotiating an acid rain treaty.157
During President Reagan’s first term, funding for the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration also fell by 22 percent as a
result of his budget request.158 Ultimately, more than a quarter of the
agency’s skilled professionals departed159 and formal auto defect
investigations fell from eleven per year to four.160
The Trump administration launched another major assault on
regulatory agency budgets that had the potential to reduce the
agencies’ scientific capacity. Early on, the administration set a goal of
reducing EPA’s staff by 20 percent through attrition, buyouts, and
reductions in force.161 During the first nine months of Trump’s tenure,
more than 700 employees retired or resigned, 200 of which were
scientists.162 Work on climate change came to a virtual halt throughout
the agency.163 In November 2017, DOI announced that it was closing
the USGS’s Eastern Geographic Science Center in Reston, Virginia
and reassigning its twenty-five employees or allowing them to retire.164
The department cited cost savings as the reason for closing the facility,
217 (1985); GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM?: REAGAN’S REGULATORY
DILEMMA 204 (1984).
157. See Robert Reinhold, Acid Rain Issue Creates Stress Between Administration and Science
Academy, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1982, at C1; Philip Shabecoff, U.S. Slashes Funds for Study on
Utilities’ Role in Acid Rain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1982, at B17.
158. JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 151 (2000).
159. Jeannye Thornton & Clemens P. Work, Highway-Safety Agency Hits a Rough Road, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 2, 1983, at 68.
160. JUDIS, supra note 158, at 151; DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE
POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA 248–49 (Beard Books 2003) (1989); see also
MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 63 (discussing the Reagan administration’s proposals
to make steep cuts in the budget for health and safety standards development).
161. Workers Leave by the Hundreds After Trump Takes Office, E&E NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017)
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060069773 [https://perma.cc/R7WX-YCPX].
162. Id.
163. See Workers Say Climate Work Quashed Under Pruitt, Trump, E&E NEWS (June 6,
2017),
https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/greenwire/stories/1060055596/search?key
word=epa [https://perma.cc/2ZM2-2CKV].
164. Scott Streater & Rob Hotakainen, USGS Science Center in Va. Set to Close, E&E NEWS
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/greenwire/stories/1060066503/search
?keyword=USGS+Science+Center+in+Va.+Set+to+Close [https://perma.cc/TB7R-UVFG].
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which conducted research on geography, remote sensing, biology and
computer science as they related to land use and climate change.165 At
the same time that his administration was making these cuts, President
Trump flouted his willingness to make decisions that should depend, to
a great degree, on science without input from scientists.166
More generally, the Trump administration’s Fiscal Year (“FY”)
2018 budget would have slashed EPA’s overall budget by 31 percent
and cut nearly all of the Agency’s budget for research on climate
change.167 It would also have reduced appropriations for the operating
costs of EPA’s Science Advisory Board by 84 percent and eliminated
the interagency United States Global Change Research Program,
which had recently received high praise from the NAS.168 It further
proposed deep cuts in environmental monitoring, a critical scientific
component of many EPA regulatory programs.169 The DOE’s program
for sponsoring biological and environmental research would have
declined 43 percent, and its program sponsoring renewable energy and

165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, In the Trump Administration, Science is Unwelcome. So is
Advice, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2018, at A1 [hereinafter In the Trump Administration].
167. Niina Heikkinen, Former Staffers Decry “Draconian” Budget Cuts, E&E NEWS (Mar. 23,
2017),
https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/1060051945/search?key
word=Former+Staffers+Decry+%E2%80%9CDraconian%E2%80%9D+Budget+Cuts [https://
perma.cc/GCG4-2XBP]; Stuart Parker, EPA Officials Defend Agency’s Duty to Follow Science
on Climate Change, INSIDE EPA (May 2, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/epa-officialsdefend-agencys-duty-follow-science-climate-change [https://perma.cc/52K3-PQR5].
168. John H. Cushman, Jr., Federal Climate Research, Targeted for Elimination by Trump,
Lauded by Scientists, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://insideclimate
news.org/news/12042017/climate-change-research-national-academies-sciences-global-warmingdonald-trump [https://perma.cc/LWW4-2XKE]; Heikkinen, supra note 167; Mooney, Trump
Wants to Slash Funds for the Outside Experts Who Make Sure EPA Gets the Science Right, supra
note 154. Perhaps sensing an impending exodus of highly qualified American climate scientists,
French President Emmanuel Macron urged them to come to France, where they would be eligible
for four-year grants of up to $1.7 million apiece to continue their work. Europe Tries to Lure
Spooked U.S. Researchers, E&E NEWS (June 27, 2017), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.
lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/1060056603/search?keyword=Europe+Tries+to+Lure+Spooke
d+U.S.+Researchers [https://perma.cc/7QUX-M4VG]. By mid-2018, thirteen scientists from
American universities had taken Macron up on his offer. U.S. Climate Scientists Flee to France,
E&E NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/
1060089121/search?keyword=U.S.+Climate+Scientists+Flee+to+France [https://perma.cc/P8UJA3UJ].
169. See Christopher Flavelle, If Trump Gets His Way, World May Not Know if U.S.
Emissions Rise, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0607/if-trump-gets-his-way-world-may-not-know-if-u-s-emissions-rise
[https://perma.cc/ZYK3SQYB]; Annie Sneed, Trump Wants Deep Cuts in Environmental Monitoring, SCIENTIFIC AM.
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-wants-deep-cuts-in-environ
mental-monitoring [https://perma.cc/J989-XPT5].
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energy efficiency would have suffered a 70 percent cut.170 The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s research budget would
have received a 22 percent cut, and its program for sponsoring research
on how low-lying communities can adapt to rising sea levels would have
been eliminated altogether.171 The USGS would have been cut by 20
percent.172 NIOSH’s budget would have declined 40 percent, and all
support for academic research would have been eliminated.173 In an oped criticizing the budget cuts, three former EPA administrators who
served during Republican administrations concluded that President
Trump “ha[d] chosen ignorance over knowledge.”174
It quickly became clear, however, that Congress was not buying
into the Trump administration’s draconian proposals.175 At the end of
the day, Congress left nearly all of the programs in place and reduced
the budgets only modestly.176 Despite the congressional rejection of his
first budget cuts, President Trump proposed similar cuts in his FY 2019
budget proposal, but after the warring factions in Congress struck a

170. Christopher Flavelle, Trump Budget Slashes Climate Spending, BLOOMBERG (May 23,
2017, 3:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-23/trump-budget-slashesclimate-spending-as-crazy-stuff-dropped [https://perma.cc/CE29-A55D]; What’s in Trump’s 2018
Budget Request for Science?, SCIENCE (May 23, 2017, 12:45 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2017/05/what-s-trump-s-2018-budget-request-science [https://perma.cc/TD6V-4WDG].
171. Flavelle, supra note 170; What’s in Trump’s 2018 Budget Request for Science, supra note
170.
172. Brittany Patterson, Zinke Touts Science as Trump Pushes Cuts to Research Shop, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www-eenews-net.proxy.lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/106007
3663/search?keyword=Zinke [https://perma.cc/759N-BYH7].
173. Sam Pearson, Budget Proposes Deep Cuts for NIOSH, End to Outside Research, 47
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA), May 24, 2017, at 466.
174. William D. Ruckelshaus, Lee M. Thomas & William K. Reilly, Three Republican EPA
Administrators: Trump is Putting Us on a Dangerous Path, WASH. POST (May 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/three-republican-epa-administrators-trump-isputting-us-on-a-dangerous-path/2017/05/26/10060ad2-424b-11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_
story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5be470ba9004 [https://perma.cc/MQK4-X9CE].
175. See Marianne Lavelle, Congress to Pruitt: We’re Not Cutting EPA Budget to Trump’s
Levels, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 15, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15062017/
scott-pruitt-epa-budget-hearing-congress-opposes-trump-cuts [https://perma.cc/PU36-GVNT];
Jeffrey Mervis & David Malakoff, House Lawmakers Balk at Most Trump Science Cuts in Early
Bills, SCIENCE (June 30, 2017), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/06/house-lawmakers-balkmost-trump-science-cuts-early-bills [https://perma.cc/EJ7T-666T].
176. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Spending Plan Passed by Congress Is a Rebuke to Trump.
Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/trumpgovernment-spending-bill.html [https://perma.cc/XJH4-LH66]; Scott Waldman, Trump Seeks Big
Cuts to Science Across Agencies, E&E NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www-eenewsnet.proxy.lib.duke.edu/climatewire/stories/1060073703/search?keyword=+Trump+Seeks+Big+
Cuts+to+Science+Across+Agencies [https://perma.cc/PHN5-TNQF].
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budget deal that made more money available for 2019, science budgets
did not suffer nearly as much as they had in the original proposal.177
2. Changing Organizational Charts and Shifting Personnel.
Politically appointed agency officials can enhance their ability to
substitute policy for science by arranging agency decisionmaking
procedures to give them multiple opportunities to review the work of
the scientists. Early in the Reagan administration, OSHA head Thorne
Auchter reorganized the agency’s procedures to establish a Regulation
Review Committee composed of high-level political appointees, and
he charged it with “reviewing documents and issues resulting from the
standard development process.”178 Longtime OSHA staffers concluded
that “the procedural quagmire that predictably resulted . . . reflected
an undisguised desire of upper-level management to slow down the
agency’s already ponderous internal rulemaking process.”179
Moreover, by positioning appointees as the final step in “reviewing”
the technical analyses, this new organizational chart seemed to provide
a covert filter for translating the scientific record into policy in ways
that were more favorable to the administration’s preferred policies.
One of Administrator Lisa Jackson’s first actions after President
Obama appointed her to head EPA was to limit the authorship of a
critical “policy” summary of the technical literature for the NAAQS
reviews solely to the technical staff.180 Previously, for this particular

177. See, e.g., Kevin Bogardus, Omnibus Would Keep Steady Funding, E&E NEWS (Mar. 22,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060077195 [https://perma.cc/45YU-5KUG]; Kevin
Bogardus, Proposal Would Cut Funding by 23%, Ax Hundreds of Jobs, E&E NEWS, (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060077195/search?keyword=Omnibus+Would
+Keep+Steady+Funding [https://perma.cc/H38N-FPDG]; George Cahlink, Bipartisan Deal
Blunts Trump Plan’s Impact on Agencies, E&E NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060073601/search?keyword=+Bipartisan+Deal+Blun
ts+Trump+Plan%E2%80%99s+Impact+on+Agencies [https://perma.cc/GR2R-QF3A]; Jennifer
A. Dlouhy, Christopher Flavelle, Eric Roston & Abby Smith, Trump Puts Energy Saving, Climate
Plans on Chopping Block Again, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Feb. 12, 2018), https://news.bloomberg
environment.com/environment-and-energy/trump-puts-energy-saving-climate-plans-onchopping-block-again [https://perma.cc/4KSZ-92AD]; Davis, supra note 176; Jeffrey Mervis,
Congress Gives Science a Record Funding Boost, SCIENCE, Mar. 30, 2018, at 1447; Science Gets
Modest Reprieve in Trump Budget, SCIENCE, Feb. 16, 2018, at 723; Waldman, supra note 176.
178. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 138, at 64.
179. Id.
180. Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of
Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463,
497 (2012); Andrew Childers, Jackson Reinstates EPA Staff Paper in Review of National Air
Quality Standards, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1231 (2009); see Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson,
Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Elizabeth Craig, Acting Assistant Adm’r, Air & Radiation,
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report, political officials could exert a heavy hand in “explaining” what
the technical research revealed; now they would be excluded from
participating in an effort to ensure that the staff’s assessment was as
scientifically robust as possible.181 Jackson concluded that the previous
arrangement “complicated and delayed the NAAQS development
process and made it vulnerable to the introduction of policy options
that are not supported by the relevant scientific information.”182 The
head of the CASAC stated that the change represented “a strong
reaffirmation of the importance of the science committee.”183
Environmental groups also supported the action.184 Jackson further cut
back some of the formal interagency consultation steps in EPA’s
development of Integrated Risk Information System (“IRIS”)
standards establishing target exposures for inhalation and ingestion of
hazardous substances, and she required all interagency discussions to
be made public.185 Jackson’s changed IRIS process underscored how
extensively the previous process, developed during the George W.
Bush administration, allowed for repeated interagency negotiations
that both impeded rulemaking and led to secret adjustments to the
agency’s underlying scientific assessments.186
In early April 2018, President Trump signed a presidential
memorandum ordering EPA to change several aspects of its
implementation of the Clean Air Act.187 EPA responded by changing
the procedures for establishing NAAQS one more time. Administrator
Pruitt redirected the line of authority for the office conducting the
analyses (the Office of Research and Development) from the agency’s
science advisor to an office managed by a political appointee (the
Office of Air and Radiation), a shift that marked a significant
departure from the historic insulation of EPA’s Office of Research and

& Lek Kadeli, Acting Assistant Adm’r, Research and Development (May 21, 2009),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/pdfs/NAAQSReviewProcessMemo52109.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AD5H-7KPS].
181. Childers, supra note 180.
182. Id.
183. John Sullivan, EPA to Restore Scientific Review Process, INQUIRER (May 22, 2009, 3:01
AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/homepage/20090522_EPA_to_restore_scientific_review
_process.html [https://perma.cc/D7B7-KA2G].
184. Childers, supra note 180.
185. See EPA, IRIS PROGRESS REPORT 4 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-06/documents/iris_report_to_congress_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QGL-7JMY].
186. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 49–51, 116–18.
187. Presidential Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,761, 16,761–62 (Apr. 12, 2018).
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Development from political controls.188 Pruitt also directed the
CASAC to begin offering advice on the adverse social, economic, and
energy impacts of the standards as well as the science underlying the
standards and to focus more specifically on the relative contributions
of natural and anthropogenic activities when it reviewed the NAAQS,
the implication being that EPA would not have to tighten NAAQS to
the extent that natural phenomena caused emissions of the relevant
pollutant.189 The memo further directed the staff to focus more heavily
on the possibility of thresholds and background levels of the criteria
pollutants “for context.”190 Environmental groups and legal scholars
criticized the memo as a backdoor way to allow the agency to consider
cost in setting NAAQS, despite a unanimous Supreme Court holding
that cost was not a relevant consideration at the standard-setting
stage.191
Political appointees can also sideline agency scientists by
reassigning them to meaningless positions.192 Complaining that “‘30
percent of the crew [at the DOI]’ was not ‘loyal to the flag,’”193
Secretary Ryan Zinke appointed a board of political appointees to
reassign members of the department’s 227 senior executive service
employees to new positions.194 In what became known around the
department as the “Thursday-night massacre,” the board reassigned
twenty-seven scientists and technical experts from jobs in which they
were using their skills to protect the nation’s natural resources to jobs
where, in many cases, their expertise was not needed.195 Several of the

188. Memorandum from Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Assistant Adm’rs
1 (May 9, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-05/documents/image2018-05-09173219.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5RX-GGVN].
189. Id. at 4–11.
190. Id. at 8.
191. Gavin Bade, Pruitt NAAQS Memo Part of Broad Strategy to Weaken Air Regs, Lawyers
Say, UTIL. DIVE (May 11, 2018) (quoting John Walke of the NRDC and Sean Hecht of UCLA).
192. See, e.g., Davenport, In the Trump Administration, supra note 166, at A1 (stating that
Department of Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue moved the scientists in the office devoted to
international food safety to a new office he established to encourage greater exports of U.S.
agricultural products).
193. Kellie Lunney, Zinke Advances Overhaul as He Questions Loyalty of Workers, E&E
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060061733 [https://perma.cc/
ED7D-ZJD4]. A spokeswoman for the American Federation of Government Employees noted
that civil service employees swore an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the United States,
not to a political party. Id.
194. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR
EXECUTIVES AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 9 (2018).
195. Adam Federman, The Plot to Loot American’s Wilderness: A Little-Known Bureaucrat
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reassigned specialists believed that their reassignments were related to
the fact that they were working in the areas of climate change, energy,
and resource conservation.196 One of them, Joel Clement, protested his
reassignment in an op-ed in the Washington Post and a formal
whistleblower complaint against the department.197 Clement was an
expert in forest ecology and had worked in the department for seven
years on issues at the intersection of climate science and public lands.198
At the time of the reassignment, he was serving as the director of the
department’s Office of Policy Analysis where he was responsible for
the department’s efforts to address climate change resiliency in the
Arctic.199 He was reassigned to a position in the department’s
accounting office where he was supposed to be in charge of employees
auditing royalty payments.200 Clement admitted that he was wholly
unqualified for his new position, and his new boss confirmed that the
Named James Cason Is Reshaping the Department of the Interior, NATION (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-plot-to-sell-americas-wilderness [https://perma.cc/WVS7SYDD]. The Department’s Office of Inspector General later concluded that the board did not
provide any reasons for selecting the twenty-seven officials that were reassigned, “nor did it
gather the information needed to make informed decisions about the reassignments.” DEP’T OF
THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 194, at 1.
196. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 194, at 7. The move
was supported by the industries that extracted mineral resources from leased federal lands,
because they believed that the departments natural resource specialists were “making decisions
based on an agenda” and were “oftentimes making things up.” David Schultz & Alan Kovski,
Zinke Preparing to Reshape Interior Through Personnel, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 21, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/zinke-preparing-reshape-n73014453634 [https://perma.cc/PX62-CFNT].
197. Joel Clement, I’m a Scientist. I’m Blowing the Whistle on the Trump Administration,
WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-a-scientist-the-trumpadministration-reassigned-me-for-speaking-up-about-climate-change/2017/07/19/389b8dce-6b1211e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.87af5510d0e5
[https://
perma.cc/5BW7-2ZAE] [hereinafter Clement, I’m a Scientist]; Complaint of Possible Prohibited
Personnel Practice or Other Prohibited Activity from Joel Clement to U.S. Office of Special
Counsel (July 12, 2017) [hereinafter Clement Complaint].
198. Sabrina Shankman, Whistleblower Case Shows How Trump Tries to Silence Science,
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (July 20, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20072017/whistle
blower-trump-intimidation-abuse-power-climate-scientists-joel-clement-zinke [https://perma.cc/
J9KM-KU2T].
199. Brittany Patterson, Scientist on Adaptation Reassigned to Job with “No Duties,” E&E
NEWS (July 20, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060057660 [https://perma.cc/
L9WD-D4SJ]; Clement Complaint, supra note 197, at 6. Clement also chaired the Community
Resilience Working Group of the White House Arctic Executive Steering Committee, which was
established during the Obama administration to coordinate and reconcile priorities among the
twenty-fve federal agencies with responsibilities for Alaska’s arctic regions. Mark Brzezinski, The
Crisis in the Arctic, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/
01/the-crisis-in-the-arctic-214649 [https://perma.cc/4WSK-WJ3M]; Clement Complaint, supra
note 197, at 6.
200. Clement Complaint, supra note 197, at 12.
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office to which he was reassigned had no need for an employee with his
expertise.201
Clement believed that he was reassigned to a position for which
he was unqualified because the department’s political leaders did not
agree with the scientific consensus amongst the department’s experts:
that global warming was a serious enough problem to warrant the
assistance that Clement’s group had been providing to Native villages
in Alaska where “the land upon which citizens’ homes and schools
stand is newly vulnerable to storms, floods, and waves.”202 He further
concluded that he was being punished for bringing the plight of the
Native villagers to the attention of White House officials and, later, to
the international community at recent conferences.203 Noting that other
DOI experts were also “being sidelined,”204 he argued that Secretary
Zinke’s promise to reduce the department’s staff through
“reassignment” assumed that reassigning professionals to positions in
which their talents were irrelevant would induce them to resign.205
Clement himself resigned in October 2017.206
C. Changing the Rules for Scientific Deliberations
A final tactic, which is gaining considerable momentum under the
Trump administration, is to alter the procedural rules within the agency
for conducting the technical analysis and peer review of scientific
information. Existing rules for more open-ended, scientifically
grounded practices can be altered in ways that lead to more politically
desirable outcomes by: stacking scientific advisory committees,
altering the role of expert peer review panels or, even more invasively,

201. Id.
202. Clement, I’m a Scientist, supra note 197.
203. Id.
204. Brittany Patterson, Meet the Climate Guy Who Quit Interior, E&E NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060072973 [https://perma.cc/AVN5-BA8H].
205. Clement, I’m a Scientist, supra note 197.
206. Darryl Fears, Interior Department Whistleblower Resigns; Bipartisan Former Appointees
Object to Zinke’s Statements, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2017/10/04/whistleblower-resigns-keeping-my-voice-more-importantthan-keeping-my-job/?utm_term=.cadd274a5d3f [https://perma.cc/MF2D-VG39]. The North
American Congress for Conservation Biology presented an award to Clement for “his work on
climate change and his ‘courage in upholding the highest standards of scientific integrity in
government service.’” Katie Langin, This Trump Administration Whistleblower Has Some Advice
for Young Scientists, SCIENCE (July 30, 2018, 11:30 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/
07/trump-administration-whistleblower-s-message-young-scientists-do-time-federal-service
[https://perma.cc/J4XC-6NRB].
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dictating how agency staffers are allowed to consider and use evidence
in their technical analyses. Each is considered in turn.
1. Marginalizing External Review of Agency Science. Since
scientific peer review is intended to ensure the reliability of the staff
assessments, one way to move the science underlying regulation
toward more deregulatory ends is to manipulate or marginalize outside
advisory committees.
At first blush, the mammoth size of this “fifth branch” of science
advisors seems to limit the ability of a new administration to alter or
adjust their role.207 The federal government has created more than 200
scientific advisory committees consisting of outside experts from
academia, industry and public interest groups to advise federal
agencies on how to bring scientific and technical information to bear
on pressing issues at the intersection of science and policy.208 Agencies
typically hire scientists and engineers with expertise in the kind of
scientific issues they address. But scientific advisory committees allow
them to draw on the expertise of highly credentialed researchers who
frequently hold prestigious positions in major universities,
corporations and other nongovernmental organizations. Serving
without pay or with modest stipends, these prestigious scientists and
engineers “provide an important vehicle for providing decisionmakers
with robust, professional, and up-to-date scientific advice.”209 Scientific
advisory committees also provide a valuable educational function
because they “provide a transparent and objective eye that helps the
public know when the government is making sound, science-based
decisions.”210 And the objectivity of their advice allows the public to
hold agency leaders accountable when they base their decisions on
policies that run contrary to agency authorizing statutes.211
To the extent these that advisory committees do not have a
statutory basis, however, agency leaders can simply disband
committees that offer advice that runs contrary to their deregulatory

207. SHEILA JASANOFF, Judgment Under Siege: The Three-Body Problem of Expert
Legitimacy, in SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON 151, 157–59 (2012).
208. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, ABANDONING SCIENCE ADVICE 3 (2018),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/01/abandoning-science-advice-fullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4B2-E87P].
209. Id.
210. Id. at 4.
211. Id.
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policy preferences.212 After the National Human Research Protections
Advisory Committee of the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) and its Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing
attracted opposition from religious groups during the George W. Bush
administration, upper-level officials in the department simply
abolished them.213 During the Trump administration, Interior
Secretary Zinke allowed DOI’s Advisory Committee on Climate
Change and Natural Resource Science to expire because the
administration was not interested in advice about how to protect the
nation’s natural resources from climate disruption.214 Similarly, Acting
Administrator Andrew Wheeler in October 2018 disbanded two large
advisory panels that the seven-person CASAC had relied on for more
than thirty years to assist it in reviewing scientific documents that
EPA’s staff prepared in connection with its five-year reviews of the
NAAQS for PM, thereby depriving CASAC of the particularized
expertise that it needed to do its job.215
In agencies that rely heavily on scientific advisory committees,
political appointees can also increase the probability that committees
yield favorable assessments by purging them of scientists who are likely
to provide unfavorable assessments and replacing them with scientists
who are more likely to provide assessments that are consistent with
their policy views.216 This strategy is best accomplished discreetly. As
President Reagan learned, when “hit lists” of disfavored science
advisors are revealed in Science magazine, they can generate a strong
negative public reaction.217

212. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 187 (2008).
213. Id.
214. Michael Doyle & Brittany Patterson, Climate Advisory Group Died Quietly, E&E NEWS
(Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060058869 [https://perma.cc/5D38-PL5N]
(quoting former committee member Paul Beier, Northern Arizona University).
215. Sean Reilly, EPA Scraps Science Panel: “Your Service . . . Has Concluded,” E&E NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060102455 [https://perma.cc/PG4V-7MK6];
Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Disbands Review Panels for Some Federal Air Quality Standards,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Oct. 12, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/epa-disbands-review-panels-for-some-federal-air-quality-standards-1
[https://perma.cc/93YL-STN5]; see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 208, at 7
(lamenting the FDA’s disbandment of its Food Advisory Committee, which had since 1992
provided expert advice on food science, nutrition and food safety).
216. See Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696 (noting that “[o]fficials chose science advisory
committee members based on who they voted for rather than scientific credentials”).
217. Eliot Marshall, Hit List at EPA?, 219 SCIENCE 1303, 1303 (1983).
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Observers of the George W. Bush administration witnessed
several instances of attempts to stack advisory committees with
members that were sympathetic to administration positions.218 For
example, HHS completely revamped the twenty-four-member Board
of Scientific Counselors of the National Center for Environmental
Health (“BOSC”), an agency that conducts research on the effects of
environmental contaminants on human health and provides advice and
support to state, federal and international agencies on environmental
health issues.219 Several of the new appointees were well known for
their connections to the chemical industry.220 At the same time, HHS
removed a prominent researcher at Johns Hopkins University who had
in the past helped environmental groups in regulatory matters.221 A
spokesperson for HHS defended the Department’s “prerogative to
hear preferentially from experts who share the president’s
philosophical sensibilities.”222
However, the EPA’s “hit list” under President Reagan and the
stacking of science advisory panels under President George W. Bush
look quaint compared to the techniques used in the Trump
administration to gain greater political control over the scientific
advisory process. Whether these new tactics actually help to move
agency decisions in a more deregulatory direction remains an open
question.223 Still, the tactics are sufficiently dramatic that they have the

218. See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 212, at 186 (describing an “epidemic of stacking”
advisory committees during the George W. Bush Administration, and noting that public criticism
of the practice did not deter the administration); Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and Federal
Advisory Committees, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454, 1456 (2004) (criticizing the George W. Bush
administration for stacking science advisory committees).
219. About NCEH, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/Information/
about.htm [https://perma.cc/AAW7-M3RM]; Weiss, HHS Seeks Science Advice to Match Bush
Views, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at A1.
220. Dan Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel, 297 SCIENCE 1456, 1457 (2002).
One new committee member, Dennis Paustenbach, had over the years testified on dozens of
occasions for chemical industry defendants in toxic tort litigation. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 219,
at A9.
221. Ferber, supra note 220, at 1457.
222. Weiss, supra note 219, at A8; see also generally Chris Clarke, Bush’s Bizarre Science, 2
EARTH ISLAND J. 36 (2003) (reporting on the Secretary of Health and Human Services allowing
the expiration of terms of the existing members of FDA’s Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory
Committee and replacing them with eleven members, four of which were anti-abortion
advocates); Karen Tumulty, Jesus and the FDA, TIME, Oct. 14, 2002, at 26 (discussing the lack of
credentials of one of the new committee members).
223. Scott Waldman, EPA Advisers Got Oil Funding for Studies Against Car Rule, E&E
NEWS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060078707 [https://perma.cc/5A8FNU5E] (discussing the EPA staff’s considerable record that anchors the deliberations).
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potential to slow down agency decisionmaking, especially in situations
where the agency is statutorily required to get feedback from advisory
bodies.
Three particularly noteworthy shifts in the use of science advisory
boards taking place under the Trump administration are apparently
intended to move the advisory apparatus in a more deregulatory
direction: (1) altering the composition of the existing boards, (2)
creating policies that make future boards more industry-friendly by
eliminating experts, and (3) reducing scientific advisory board
influence.
Altering the Composition. Since science advisors typically have
fixed terms, it might be expected that altering the composition of the
boards would need to happen gradually and incrementally.224 The
Trump administration, however, has devised ways around this
challenge. First, in a break with tradition, the administration cleared
out dozens of existing science advisors, either by refusing to renew
their terms or by removing disfavored members whose terms had not
expired.225 Within a few months, the Trump administration dispatched
twelve of the eighteen members of the BOSC.226 Nine members were
terminated before their terms were completed,227 and another five were
not renewed after their terms had expired.228 In replacing these
members, Administrator Pruitt tripled the number of industry
representatives on the board.229 The numbers are startling. In early
2017, 79 percent of the board’s members were academics and 6 percent

224. See, e.g., U.S. EPA SCI. ADVISORY BOARD, REORGANIZATION OF THE EPA SCIENCE
ADVISORY BOARD (SAB) 3, EPA-SAB-04-001 (Nov. 2003) (discussing fixed terms).
225. Sean Reilly, 38 Science Advisers Get Pink Slips — Internal Email, E&E NEWS (June 20,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/06/20/stories/1060056308 [https://perma.cc/B9UJ5W7H].
226. Scott Waldman, Spokesman Defends Removal of 12 Scientists, E&E NEWS (May 9, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/05/09/stories/1060054232
[https://perma.cc/4ZJQ7D7Z].
227. Georgina Gustin & Marianne Lavelle, EPA Strips One Science Board, While Likely
Eyeing a Bigger Prize, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (May 12, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/08052017/epa-science-advisory-board-dismissed-scott-pruitt-donald-trump
[https://
perma.cc/VRN3-SEV2]. The Chairwoman was also terminated after she criticized the
termination of these other, valuable members. Kevin Bogardus, Pruitt Demotes Critic as He
Remakes Science Boards, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060065333
[https://perma.cc/PDM4-AYYN].
228. Rachel Leven, Path of EPA Science Board Unclear Amid Upheaval, BLOOMBERG ENV’T
(May 8, 2017), https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/path-of-epa-science-boardunclear-amid-upheaval [https://perma.cc/FQ83-BAFX].
229. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 208, at 5.
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came from industry.230 By early 2018, only 50 percent of the members
were academics and 23 percent came from industry.231 Fourteen of the
new members either consulted for or worked directly for the fossil fuel
and chemical industries.232 Administrator Pruitt’s office explained that
“[t]he administrator believes we should have people on this board who
understand the impact of regulations on the regulated community.”233
Pruitt’s successor, Andrew Wheeler, replaced five of the CASAC’s
seven members—most of whom had been academics—with employees
of state and local agencies, and he appointed a consultant to the oil
industry to be its chairman.234
With dozens of open slots across many other science advisory
boards available to fill, a number of academic scientists were replaced
by industry professionals235 or by academics outside of the mainstream,
like Dr. Robert Phalen, who believes that “[m]odern air is a little too
clean for optimum health.”236 This had a predictable effect on the
remaining academic scientists. With the changed composition of the
committees and new chairpersons, the work apparently became less
attractive to busy academic scientists. A few respected scientists
declined to serve in the current administration and others resigned
before their terms expired.237
Novel Exclusions for Expert Service on Boards. Historically,
scientists with financial connections to companies with a stake in
relevant proceedings have been disfavored as members of science
230. Id. at 6, fig.4.
231. Id.
232. Elizabeth Shogren, Here Are 8 Ways Outgoing EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Suppressed
Science, ALTERNET (July 7, 2018), https://www.alternet.org/here-are-8-ways-outgoing-epa-chiefscott-pruitt-suppressed-science [https://perma.cc/D564-LDRC].
233. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Dismisses Members of Major Scientific Review Board, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 2017) [hereinafter Davenport, E.P.A. Dismisses Members], https://www.ny
times.com/2017/05/07/us/politics/epa-dismisses-members-of-major-scientific-review-board.html
[https://perma.cc/RKJ9-FWP2].
234. Reilly, supra note 215.
235. Scott Waldman, Pruitt Signals an Embrace of Industry Researchers, E&E NEWS (Nov. 1,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/11/01/stories/1060065271 [https://perma.cc/
N7LK-3XUF].
236. Sean Reilly, New Adviser Suggested Clean Air’s ‘Not Good for the Children,’ E&E NEWS
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2017/11/03/stories/1060065617 [https://perma.
cc/3W57-9MAB].
237. Kevin Bogardus, Members of Science Subcommittee Resign in Protest, E&E NEWS (May
12, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054502/print [https://perma.cc/Y2ZK-AR2Q];
Corbin Hiar, 2 Greens Reject Invitations for Seats on EPA Advisory Panel, E&E NEWS (Mar. 30,
2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/03/30/stories/1060077847 [https://perma.cc/V7XT7D2Q].
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advisory boards because of the potential conflict of interest.238 In a
directive on science advisory board membership, Administrator Pruitt
turned the conflict rules on their head. Industry-associated members
were actively solicited to “diversify” the panels.239 By contrast,
scientists with federal grants from EPA were precluded from serving.
In the words of the directive, “no member of an EPA federal advisory
committee [shall] be currently in receipt of EPA grants.”240
Prohibiting service by scientists with federal grants is
unprecedented in the history of science advisory boards and, to our
knowledge, in the history of scientific peer review more generally.
Rather than “strengthening” membership as the directive claims in the
title, excluding talented grant recipients with intimate knowledge of
the issues EPA must address is likely to have the opposite effect. One
former science adviser and current professor at Johns Hopkins
University observed that the policy will “exclud[e] a subset of the best
and brightest minds in environmental science from participation in
what should be the highest science advisory role in the country.”241
The directive will affect the composition of future panels, but the
agency leadership is also using it to purge boards of existing members
whose research is currently supported in part by EPA funding, thereby
tipping future membership toward industry.242 Following the directive,
agency managers have asked at least four academic science advisors to
choose between continuing future service as advisors or leaving to

238. BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, IMPROVING THE USE OF SCIENCE IN REGULATORY
POLICY 19–23 (2009), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%
20Science%20Report%20fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CBH-2PDJ].
239. E. SCOTT PRUITT, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. EPA, STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING
MEMBERSHIP ON EPA FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES (2017), https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/final_draft_fac_directive-10.31.2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G4TB-NLQZ]. The directive references diversifying representation. The
administration separately indicated that one form of this diversification was increasing industry
representation. Davenport, EPA Dismisses Members, supra note 233.
240. PRUITT, supra note 239.
241. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Pruitt’s Grant Ban Stokes Concerns About EPA’s Integrity,
LAW360 (Nov. 1, 2017, 9:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/980575/pruitt-s-grant-banstokes-concerns-about-epa-s-integrity [https://perma.cc/7253-8FJ7] (quoting Dr. Thomas A.
Burke).
242. Sean Reilly, Pruitt Sweeps More Scientists Off Advisory Panels, E&E NEWS (Dec. 22,
2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060069799 [https://perma.cc/4QND-RJTR].
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complete the work under their EPA scientific grants.243 Several chose
the latter option.244
Bypassing Existing Science Advisory Boards. Still another strategy
for avoiding external review of regulatory decisions is benign neglect
of statutorily mandated scientific advisory committees. The agency can
cut the budgets for advisory committees or simply decline to schedule
advisory committee meetings to review proposed agency actions. As
noted earlier, during the first months of the Trump administration, the
OMB proposed to cut the budget for EPA’s science advisors by 84
percent.245 During the first year of the Trump administration, the
number of scientific advisory committee meetings declined by 20
percent from the last year of the Obama administration.246 According
to a survey conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists (“UCS”),
more than 65 percent of the chartered advisory committees in the
FDA, EPA, and DOI failed to meet as often as their charters required
in 2017.247 EPA failed to convene its Great Lakes Advisory Committee
for over a year,248 and others were proceeding so slowly that their role
was compromised or sidelined completely.249

243. Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, ‘Mr. Pruitt Is Welcome To Officially Fire Me’ – As EPA
Carries Out Controversial Policy, One Scientist Balks, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/10/epa-extendscontroversial-conflict-of-interest-policy-to-nearly-two-dozen-advisory-boards/?noredirect=on
&utm_term=.945f6dd3dfde [https://perma.cc/5JVV-82WC]; Sean Reilly, Pruitt’s Grant Ban Hits
Advisory Panel at Critical Time, E&E NEWS (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/2018/04/16/stories/1060079173 [https://perma.cc/BWU5-RGK7].
244. See 2 Iowa State Professors Forced off Advisory Panel, E&E NEWS (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/01/26/stories/1060072065?show_login=1&t=https%3A
%2F%2Fwww.eenews.net%2Fgreenwire%2F2018%2F01%2F26%2Fstories%2F1060072065
[https://perma.cc/7H2S-HXNZ] (noting two professors leaving EPA advisory committees to
continue using federal funding).
245. Scott Waldman, Agency Fires Science Advisers, E&E NEWS (May 6, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054154
[https://perma.cc/8QRT-N7TY].
Ultimately,
Congress rejected most of the Trump administration’s proposed budget cuts. See Timothy Cama,
Spending Bill Rejects Trump’s Proposed EPA Cut, HILL (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:58 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/379679-spending-bill-rejects-trumps-proposedepa-cut [https://perma.cc/24GT-NYXM] (noting that Congress chose to maintain EPA’s 2017
funding in 2018, rather than implementing a 31 percent budget cut).
246. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 208, at 4.
247. Id.
248. Ariel Wittenberg, Once Busy EPA Advisory Panel Languishes Under Trump, E&E
NEWS (May 23, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/05/23/stories/1060082513
[https://perma.cc/L93C-97ZB]; News Release, EPA, EPA Re-Establishes Great Lakes Advisory
Board, EPA NEWS RELEASES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-reestablishes-great-lakes-advisory-board [https://perma.cc/83KF-B5PX]
249. See Maria Hegstad, EPA Seeks New Science Advisors, But Delay May Halt CASAC in
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As they pursued their deregulatory agendas, these agencies were
apparently not interested in what outside scientists had to say. For
example, the National Parks System Advisory Board was established
in 1935 to advise the NPS on issues related to the nation’s national
parks, including in recent years how to mitigate the impacts of climate
disruption on important natural and cultural sites.250 Based on a report
by the advisory board’s science subcommittee, which was comprised of
prominent scientists including a Nobel Prize winner and the president
of Woods Hole,251 the director of the NPS issued a December 2016
order calling for the staff to “[c]onduct and/or facilitate scientific and
scholarly inquiry that is directly applicable to current or expected
resource management challenges” and to incorporate the
precautionary principle and adaptive management into its resource
stewardship.252 Early in the Trump administration, however, Interior
Secretary Zinke ordered the acting NPS director to rescind the order
without consulting the advisory board, several members of which had

Fall, INSIDE EPA (June 26, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/epa-seeks-new-scienceadvisors-delay-may-halt-casac-fall [https://perma.cc/ZBV8-FG3Y] (noting a two-month delay);
Jennifer Lu, Air Pollutant Reviews Stalled: EPA Advisers Haven’t Met in Months, BLOOMBERG
ENV’T (Mar. 15, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X1TQ8H0
O000000?bna_news_filter=environment-and-energy&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001621a75df18
a76a9f75ca920000#jcite [https://perma.cc/K8K4-V5DC] (“Three required scientific reviews for
federally regulated air pollutants are on hold due to EPA delays.”); Scott Waldman, EPA
Advisory Board Hasn’t Met in 6 Months, E&E NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/stories/1060075513 [https://perma.cc/K4N2-6EHJ] (“The U.S. EPA Science Advisory
Board has not met in at least six months, and some of its members say it’s being sidelined to avoid
getting in the way of agency Administrator Scott Pruitt’s anti-regulatory agenda.”). Even the
reformulated science advisory boards, staffed with more industry-based members, found
themselves marginalized. The science advisors in the reconfigured Board of Scientifc Advisors
complained, for example, that the members have received “insufficient information on the science
behind several of Pruitt’s decisions” and have not been consulted on others. Marianne Lavelle,
In Rebuke to Pruitt, EPA Science Board Votes To Review Climate Policy Changes,
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (June 1, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/31052018/epa-scienceadvisory-board-review-pruitt-climate-change-clean-power-plan-auto-standards-secret-sciencepolicy [https://perma.cc/RF3X-E7X4].
250. Coral Davenport, Citing ‘Inexcusable’ Treatment, Advisers Quit National Parks Panel,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/climate/trump-nationalparks.html [https://perma.cc/5FT4-VDLX]; Georgina Gustin, Trump Administration Deserts
Science Advisory Boards Across Agencies, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18012018/science-climate-change-advisory-board-epainterior-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/QA75-MTKC].
251. NAT’L PARK SYS. ADVISORY BD. SCI. COMM., REVISITING LEOPOLD: RESOURCE
STEWARDSHIP IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 24 (2012).
252. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERV., DIRECTOR’S ORDER #100: RESOURCE
STEWARDSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY §§ 6, 7.2, https://www.nps.gov/policy/dorders/do_100.htm
[https://perma.cc/KT2Z-RZHJ]. The order was rescinded on August 16, 2017. Id.
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devoted many hours to crafting it.253 Although the Department’s press
office elected to keep the public in the dark about the rescission,
members of the board soon found out.254 One of them, Clemson
University professor Gary Machlis, called the rescission an act of
“willful ignorance” that was part of the Trump administration’s
attempts to pull back any Obama administration actions having to do
with climate change.255 Citing the “inexcusable” treatment the
committee had received from the administration, nine of the twelve
board members resigned to protest administration decisions that had
ignored science and belittled DOI’s environmental responsibilities.256
A department spokeswoman said that DOI “welcom[ed] their
resignations.”257
*

*

*

The Good Science Rationale. In justifying these decisions, the
Trump administration claims to be endeavoring to “strengthen” the
quality of science at the agency.258 In rolling out the proposal barring
scientific advisors from holding EPA grants, for example,
Administrator Pruitt stated that “[w]hatever science comes out of
EPA, shouldn’t be political science.”259 Yet records reveal that neither
the agency’s mainstream scientists nor its staff were consulted in

253. Juliet Eilperin, Nearly All Members of National Park Service Advisory Panel Resign in
Frustration, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/nearly-all-members-of-national-park-service-advisory-panel-resign-in-frustration/2018/
01/16/b322ef5e-fae3-11e7-ad8c-ecbb62019393_story.html?utm_term=.234d5cecb754 [https://
perma.cc/2PSN-MP7Q]; Rob Hotakainen, Emails: How Zinke Scrapped Obama’s Climate Order,
E&E NEWS (Aug. 6 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/08/06/stories/1060092837
[https://perma.cc/Z4V6-T97J] [hereinafter Hotakainen, Emails]; Rob Hotakainen, Zinke’s ‘Crazy
Policies’ Sparked Resignations – Ex Adviser, E&E NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060071205
[https://perma.cc/ALK7-8S5U]
[hereinafter
Hotakainen, Zinke’s ‘Crazy Policies’].
254. Hotakainen, Emails, supra note 253.
255. Rob Hotakainen, NPS Chief Scraps Climate-Focused Order, E&E NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060059511 [https://perma.cc/U4W7-HYUA]. The NPS also
failed to consult with the committee regarding its decisions to raise park visitor fees and to reverse
an Obama administration ban on plastic water bottles in national parks. Eilperin, supra note 253.
256. Davenport, supra note 250.
257. Hotakainen, Zinke’s ‘Crazy Policies’, supra note 253.
258. See PRUITT, supra note 239.
259. Administrator Pruitt Issues Directive to Ensure Independence, Geographic Diversity &
Integrity in EPA Science Committees, U.S. EPA (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/administrator-pruitt-issues-directive-ensure-independence-geographic-diversity
[https://perma.cc/ZH4T-NMJL].
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developing this policy.260 A court order disclosing the underlying
documents used to prepare the directive revealed that the policy was
produced by Republican politicians working with representatives of
various industries.261 Likewise, the agency leadership failed to consult
with its staff or mainstream scientists in preparing its “transparency”
proposal; even EPA’s own reconfigured BOSC “was left in the
dark.”262
Aftermath. These strategies for reorienting the external scientific
review process in a more deregulatory direction have not gone
unnoticed. Investigative journalists and reporters have been watching
and reporting on the weekly and sometimes daily activities governing
EPA’s use of science advisory boards.263 Members of scientific advisory
committees have also spoken out in protest;264 members of Congress
have requested reports from the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) and demanded information on scientific decisionmaking
processes;265 and at least one House of Representatives hearing has
been held on the Trump administration’s unique practices with respect
260. Sean Reilly, GOP Lawmakers, Industry Had EPA’s Ear on Advisory Panels, E&E NEWS
(May 24, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060082657 [https://perma.cc/FT39-CRG8].
261. Id.
262. Sylvia Carignan, Pruitt’s Science Advisers Left in the Dark on Transparency Proposal (2),
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (June 29, 2018, 11:36 AM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/pruitts-science-advisers-left-in-the-dark-on-transparency-proposal-2
[https://perma.cc/9QCB-6322].
263. McGarity has collected a two-inch thick pile of news reports generated just on advisory
boards at EPA over the last eighteen months.
264. Kevin Bogardus, Pruitt Demotes Critic as He Remakes Science Boards, E&E NEWS (Nov.
1, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060065333 [https://perma.cc/A5LM-EK4H]; Niina
Heikkinen, Lawyer Calls Pruitt’s Science Shake-up Illegal, E&E NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/11/08/stories/1060065927
[https://perma.cc/X2942THF]; Rodriguez, supra note 241.
265. Kevin Bogardus, Carper Sharply Questions Move on Scientific Advisers, E&E NEWS
(May 9, 2017) https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060054267 [https://perma.cc/R4BY-DXZS]; Sylvia
Carignan, EPA Science Advisers Defend Industry Ties, Despite Democrat Doubts, BLOOMBERG
ENV’T (Jan. 10, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/epascience-advisers-defend-industry-ties-despite-democrat-doubts [https://perma.cc/H5L7-99EU];
Kyle Jahner, Sens. Ask GAO To Eye EPA’s ‘Double Standard’ on Advisers, LAW360 (Nov. 9,
2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/984025/sens-ask-gao-to-eye-epa-s-doublestandard-on-advisers [https://perma.cc/62V4-CR38]; Michael Phillis, EPA Science Board Moves
Are Concerning, Dems’ Letter Says, LAW360 (May 19, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/926203/epa-science-board-moves-are-concerning-dems-letter-says
[https://perma.cc/
A56K-2HR6]; Sean Reilly, Dems Tout Evidence of Political Meddling in Advisory Posts, E&E
NEWS:
E&E
DAILY
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2018/
02/15/stories/1060073965 [https://perma.cc/N4T9-KQH9]; Sean Reilly, Lawmakers Urge Pruitt To
Revise Policy on Science Advisers, E&E NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/
stories/1060065947 [https://perma.cc/3EM6-L7SX].
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to outside science advice at EPA.266 More House of Representatives
hearings are likely in the 116th Congress as the Democratic leadership
probes possible Trump administration abuses. A handful of lawsuits
have also been filed by affected groups, including: the expert advisors
themselves, the UCS, and the Natural Resources Defense Council
(“NRDC”).267 Each of these groups has filed one or more separate
lawsuits challenging the administration’s directive prohibiting
members from holding EPA grants.268 Whether the courts will
intervene into the Trump administration’s unprecedented assaults on
the scientific advisory process remains to be seen.
2. Constraining the Staff’s Analysis of the Best Available Science.
In the past, career scientists have been relatively unconstrained in how
they weigh the evidence or develop methods for assessing the relevant
literature.269 In the last two years, however, the Trump administration
has developed systemic policies to impose restrictions on how staff
scientists analyze and synthesize the available scientific information.
The most overt effort is EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt’s April
2018 “Transparency Rule” proposal, which would exclude from
consideration peer reviewed scientific studies if the authors do not
make all of the underlying “dose response data and models . . . publicly
available in a manner sufficient for independent validation.”270 If
finalized, the rule is poised to operate as an enforceable exclusion on
any research for which underlying data cannot be produced. The listed
exceptions are limited to “privacy, confidentiality, confidential

266. Scott Waldman, EPA Science Board Purge To Play Role in Hearing, E&E NEWS (May
22, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2017/05/22/stories/1060054864 [https://perma.cc/
VPQ7-LNF9].
267. Different lawsuits raise different objections. One case argues the EPA directive raises
the bar too high for service in violation of FACA. Amanda Reilly, 2nd Lawsuit Hits Pruitt’s
Advisory Board Directive, E&E NEWS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/stories/1060071815 [https://perma.cc/6NTD-ZH2B]. Other suits allege the directive
violates the Administrative Procedure Act in multiple ways. Sean Reilly, NRDC Sues Pruitt Over
Advisory Panel Mandate, E&E NEWS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/
2018/01/25/stories/1060071971 [https://perma.cc/3ZUR-FBPV]; cf. Maria Hegstad, Critics Float
Legal Theories to Challenge Pruitt’s Science Advisor Policy, INSIDE EPA (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://insideepa.com/daily-news/critics-float-legal-theories-challenge-pruitts-science-advisorpolicy [https://perma.cc/TS7N-WVSG] (highlighting potential legal strategies).
268. See text accompanying supra note 267.
269. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE EPA’S DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT
OF FORMALDEHYDE 155 (2011).
270. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768, 18,773
(proposed Apr. 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30) (emphasis omitted).
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business information, and . . . national and homeland security,” which
must be determined by the Administrator, presumably on a case-bycase basis.271 Although transparency is generally a desirable scientific
practice, the rule ignores the fact that scientists conducting the
epidemiological studies that EPA relies upon in promulgating
protective standards routinely promise their subjects to keep personal
information confidential. As a result, “[t]he EPA rule creates a catch22 for these researchers. If they disclose the identity of their research
subjects, then they could face criminal penalties under federal medicalprivacy laws. But if they respect the privacy of their subjects, then their
final study cannot be used by EPA.”272 In fact, it appears that the
primary purpose of the policy is to target these studies to ensure they
are not allowed to be used in the EPA’s future analyses.273 The policy
also appears to retroactively exclude all research that does not meet its
test.274 For example, highly acclaimed studies on lead toxicity—like
Herbert Needleman’s landmark paper,275 along with likely thousands
of other studies that have been used in the past by EPA in support of
regulatory standards—do not meet the proposal’s requirement for data
transparency because, for example, 30-year-old records no longer exist.
Although the EPA leadership argues that the prohibition will
“strengthen” the quality of the agency’s science, the scientific
community strongly disagrees. The editors of top scientific journals,
including Science and Nature, observe that although transparency is
critical to science, “in not every case can all data be fully shared.”276
Rather, “it is paramount that the full suite of relevant science vetted
through peer review, which includes ever more rigorous features,
inform the landscape of decisionmaking.”277 By excluding some of the
271. Id. at 18,774.
272. Robinson Meyer, Even Geologists Hate the EPA’s New Science Rule, ATLANTIC (July
17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/scott-pruitts-secret-science-rulecould-still-become-law/565325 [https://perma.cc/H2NG-PU9X].
273. Id.
274. 83 Fed. Reg. at 18,771 (“Agency’s offices should be guided by this policy to the maximum
extent practicable during ongoing regulatory action, even where such research has already been
generated, solicited, or obtained.”).
275. Herbert L. Needleman et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Performance of
Children with Elevated Dentine Lead Levels, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 689 (1979) (finding
compromised classroom performance among children with higher blood lead levels).
276. Jeremy Berg, Philip Campbell, Veronique Kiermer, Natasha Raikhel & Deborah Sweet,
Letter, Joint Statement on EPA Proposed Rule and Public Availability of Data, SCIENCE MAG.
(May 4, 2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6388/eaau0116 [https://perma.cc/P7JBZVVF].
277. Id.
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most important and informative studies—studies that have been
rigorously reviewed and rereviewed over time—the current
administration will produce impoverished and incomplete records that
in turn can be used to justify weakening protective standards and
failing to strengthen weak standards.
As if on cue, the DOI has recently published its own proposal for
limiting the scientific evidence that its scientists may consider in much
the same way as EPA’s transparency proposal.278 Politically motivated
process rules that alter what and how science can be used by agency
staffs at the earliest stages of technical deliberation are by far the most
worrisome of the Trump administration’s recent innovations. It
remains to be seen whether they will withstand the test of time.
II. ANALYSIS
The political manipulation of agency science appears widespread,
but perhaps these interventions can be justified on the ground that they
occur at the behest of a committed President eager to follow through
on the public commitments he made during the election season. As
long as the changes are made at the direction of an elected official, the
argument goes, they line up with the basic principles of our
constitutional democracy. Yet, even putting aside the hotly debated
desirability of the President’s control of agency decisions through a
unitary executive,279 most of the political manipulations of science
detailed in Part I still fail basic tests of administrative legitimacy.
First, the strategies discussed here are not transparent. Although
they are advertised as efforts to “strengthen” the agency’s science and
to use “good science” for regulation, they typically hide their
substitution of policy preferences for rigorous scientific research from
public view.280 When the manipulation is accomplished by
presidentially appointed officials in the agencies or in OMB, the

278. See Dep’t of Interior, Order No. 3369, Promoting Open Science (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/so_3369_promoting_open_science.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7YY-6LV9]; see also Michael Doyle, It’s No Secret: Dems Distrust New “Open
Science” Policy, E&E News, Oct. 12, 2018, https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2018/10/
12/stories/1060102447 [https://perma.cc/9XW3-3TMW].
279. For critical commentary on the unitary executive theory itself, see, e.g., HEIDI
KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2015); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises:
Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 360
(2010).
280. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 241, 258–62.
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president’s hand in the decisionmaking process is invisible. Even strong
theories of executive power stop well short of suggesting that this type
of scientific manipulation by political officials is appropriate. For
example, then-Professor Kagan, a proponent of a strong executive
branch, opined that political meddling in the underlying scientific
record of agency rules is troubling, and stated that it “would threaten
a kind of impartiality and objectivity in decisionmaking that conduces
to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the administrative
process.”281
Second, the strategies undermine the rigor and integrity of the
scientific information that are the basics of agency regulations. As
Professor Doremus notes, “[g]overnment cannot make good policy
decisions unless the decision makers have access to, and appropriately
use, the best available understanding of the relevant facts.”282 To the
extent that the stealth science strategies described in Part I move
agencies in the opposite direction, they compromise the objectivity of
government decision making, pervert the public’s understanding of the
reasons for agency decisions, and undermine the legitimacy of
government action.
Finally, the strategies have real world consequences. Substitution
of deregulatory policy for science has, in the past, resulted in higher
pollution loads and workplace exposures than Congress was willing to
tolerate in the authorizing statutes.283 Although it is difficult to draw a
direct line between manipulation of science and a particular death or
injury, epidemiological studies like the “Six Cities” study strongly
suggest less protective standards for PM will increase the number of
adverse health effects in exposed populations.284 Likewise, existing
epidemiological studies suggest that some children of farmworkers
who continue to be exposed to chlorpyrifos will suffer neurological
impairment.285 If EPA’s manipulation of a regulatory impact
assessments to limit the indirect effects of reducing greenhouse gas

281. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2356–58 (2001)
(urging self-restraint in White House review of agencies’ science-intensive rules).
282. Doremus, supra note 124, at 1639.
283. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.5.
284. See, e.g., Qian Di, Yan Wang, Antonella Zanobetti, Yun Wang, Petros Koutrakis,
Christine Choirat, Francesca Dominici & Joel D. Schwartz, Air Pollution and Mortality in the
Medicare Population, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2513, 2513 (2017) (“In the entire Medicare
population, there was significant evidence of adverse effects related to exposure to PM2.5 and
ozone at concentrations below current national standards.”).
285. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
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emissions from power plants successfully justifies the Trump
administration’s drastic limitation of the scope of the Obama
Administration’s greenhouse gas controls, we will all suffer from the
effects of global warming to which the added emissions will contribute.
To the extent that the political manipulation of science is a serious
matter, then, why is it so prevalent? Should not the Administrative
Procedure Act and the maze of good government laws and processes
that are currently in place prevent this kind of political meddling? It is
important to consider the limited reach of existing tools for
discouraging political manipulation of science in the discussion that
follows. As an initial matter, however, the reality of the unitary agency
must be recognized—agencies engaged in health and environmental
regulation typically operate as united, cohesive units of governance.286
The current design of most internal agency decisionmaking processes
provides few, if any, proactive barriers to prevent politically appointed
officials from tinkering with the agency’s scientific record. Instead, the
agency speaks with one voice to the public and the reviewing courts in
a way that commingles the work of the technical staff with that of the
political appointees. Political appointees and policy staff regularly
work side by side with the technical staff to prepare an agency’s
combined analysis and decision document. Even concepts of
authorship and attribution within the agency are generally, but not
always, foreign to how agencies work; indeed, the list of agency authors
of a rule or preamble or even the supporting technical analyses may
not even be available.287 In this institutional setting, the “[c]ivil servants
. . . are not directly protected against political interference with or
overriding of their professional judgments.”288
With that understanding, the courts, Congress, the agencies
themselves, and the scientific community and media are examined to
determine how well they discourage the political manipulation of
science in practice.

286. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 123 (observing that “the agencies under
study generally did not disaggregate their analyses into . . . separate steps”). This unitary agency
description may less accurately describe multimember agencies like the Federal Trade
Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the National Labor Relations board
where each commissioner has his or her own staff in addition to the general agency staff.
287. Id. at 130–31 (observing that, at least at the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, there is no meaningful form of authorship or attribution for agency
staff).
288. Doremus, supra note 124, at 1637.
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A. Courts
In theory, the courts should be capable of providing the most
direct check on the politicization of science in regulatory
decisionmaking. But in practice, courts have rarely intervened to
address the incidents reported in Part I (less than 15 percent of the
time). What accounts for this apparent failure of the courts to protect
the agencies’ use of science against political manipulation? One
important reason is the expense of litigation. For thinly financed public
interest groups, litigation has high opportunity costs and involves
delicate priority setting. Despite the reports of considerable public
interest litigation in the 1970s,289 current rates of challenges by public
interest groups to health and environmental regulations appear to be
relatively low. In an empirical analysis of all rules promulgated in the
air toxics program, one of this Article’s coauthors reported public
interest litigation rates of less than 10 percent.290 Public interest groups
readily concede that this low rate is a reflection of limited resources
and not an indication that the other rules were considered
acceptable.291
For litigation to serve as an effective deterrent to the politicization
of science, public interest groups must also have the investigatory
firepower to learn of this political manipulation in the first place. There
is little indication that these resources are available in most settings.
One public interest attorney conceded that even the choice of which
rules to read and comment on involves back-of-the-envelope, triagelike decisions made necessary by scarce resources.292 In a number of
studies, half of the health and environmental protection rules were not
commented on by anyone other than industry and some states, even
though the rules involved issues of considerable public importance.293
But even in a hypothetical world in which richly subsidized public
interest groups are able to investigate and use the court system to full
advantage, litigation is a limited tool at best for discouraging the stealth
use of science as a deregulatory strategy. It is very difficult to persuade
a reviewing court to set aside an agency deregulatory action under the

289. Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1727 (2012).
290. Id. at 1745.
291. Id. at 1746–47.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1785–86 (summarizing this literature).
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deferential “arbitrary and capricious” test of the APA.294 Perhaps more
limiting is the stark reality that litigation tends to drag on for years,
which could be consistent with deregulatory goals in some cases.
Consider, for example, a statute mandating that the agency promulgate
standards for air toxins by a deadline.295 If the administration develops
a legally risky deregulatory approach to the technical analysis that
faces a risk of being upended in litigation, the consequence of failure is
that no rule is in place until the agency writes a legally supportable
regulation.296 Either way, an administration bent on deregulation wins.
Several of the examples cited in Part I also suggest that when they
do become aware of deregulatory manipulation of science, courts are
reluctant to point fingers at the political process in concluding that the
actions are “arbitrary and capricious.”297 Indeed, even when the record
and briefs are rife with evidence of political tinkering as the cause of
the alleged agency transgressions, the courts seem to focus instead on
the agency’s explanations and not on the individual actors within and—
in the case of White House intervention—external to the agencies.298 It
is the unitary agency’s work that is arbitrary and capricious, and it is up
to the agency to fix the problem as the agency is the author. The
political actors are spared the bad publicity.
B. Congress
Congress can also become an adversary when it discovers the
political manipulation of science in regulatory agencies. When
Congress is interested in conducting effective oversight, the tools are
many and include: letters of concern to agencies; subpoenas of
documents; brutal oversight hearings; requests for NAS, GAO, and
inspector general review; documenting abuses in reports and other
forms of embarrassing publicity; and amendments to statutes that
reduce agency discretion. Yet in our accounts, the role of Congress was
generally effective only when at least one house of Congress was

294. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, President Trump’s War on Regulatory Science, 43 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (analyzing these challenges in detail).
295. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (2012).
296. Wagner, supra note 289, at 1750–59.
297. See, e.g., note 133 and accompanying text.
298. In Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the court reversed and remanded
one of EPA’s secondary standards for lack of support in the record. In doing so, however, the
court never mentioned the extensive evidence in the briefs that it was OIRA’s intervention that
created the problem, as opposed to EPA itself. See, e.g., Final Opening Brief of State Petitioners
at 32, Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 08-1200).
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controlled by a party other than that of the president. Democratcontrolled Congresses during the Reagan administration and the final
two years of the George W. Bush administration went to great lengths
to spotlight and condemn the ways that political appointees had
manipulated science.299 Some of these congressional interventions even
took the form of amendments to the authorizing legislation to limit
discretion of the agency.300
On the other hand, when the parties controlling the White House
and Congress are aligned, the tools available to Congress are more
limited—primarily consisting of the minority’s documentation of
problems (for example, through committee staff reports, GAO studies,
and inspector general reports).301 The information gathering tools
available to the minority are still very valuable, but they are insufficient
to ultimately reverse or even significantly expose deregulatory
manipulations of science.
C. Agency Counter-Pressure
Agency career employees have not always taken political
manipulation of agency science lying down. Put simply, alterations to
the scientific record cut right to the heart of the staff’s role and the
agency’s mission. And many career staffers are deeply committed to
the agency’s mission, or they would have sought higher paying or more
prestigious jobs. Indeed, as we detail above, in many cases the
manipulations were publicized only because agency staffers were
willing to call out the clandestine activities of politically appointed
officials.
The ability of an agency’s career staffers to serve as a check on
political manipulations, however, is only as strong as the external
oversight mechanisms available to them. And in the case of the
299. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1634–35 (describing the backlash against the
Reagan administration’s manipulation of scientific information concerning endangered species);
see also generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT FOR
SUBCOMM. CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER, COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 110TH CONG., NIPPING IRIS IN
THE BUD: SUPPRESSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (June 11, 2009), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/miller-iris-report-june-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5GHR-X2F8] (describing Bush OIRA’s effort at undermining EPA’s initiative to establish the
scientific database Integrated Risk Information System).
300. See, e.g., James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the
1980’s, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (1986) (describing Congress’ efforts to legislatively force EPA to
regulate under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
301. See infra Part II.C.
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political manipulation of the scientific record, there are only limited
oversight tools, such as congressional oversight hearings and the
agency’s Office of Inspector General (which can sometimes be
compromised itself by politics).302 Most remaining enforcement and
oversight mechanisms are housed within the executive branch and
subject to control by the same political officials the agency staff seeks
to expose and possibly discipline. We examine the effectiveness of the
most promising tools—science integrity policies, the use of science
advisors, and staff whistle-blowing—below and conclude that, while
important, they are not sufficient to counteract most of these scientific
manipulations.
1. Science Integrity Policies. Most agencies now have scientific
integrity policies in place to explicitly protect against the political
manipulation of science.303 Reacting to perceived abuses of science
during the George W. Bush administration, President Obama signed a
memorandum in March 2009 asking the director of the OSTP to
develop policies for ensuring scientific integrity in federal agency
decisionmaking.304 In addition, each agency was to craft “rules and
procedures to ensure the integrity of the scientific process within the
agency.”305 Among the requirements are the commands that political
appointees “should not suppress or alter scientific or technological
findings,”306 and “[t]o the extent permitted by law, there should be
transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of scientific and
technological information in policymaking.”307 Finally, agencies should
put “in place procedures [for] identify[ing] and address[ing] instances
in which the scientific process or the integrity of scientific and
technological information may be compromised,” procedures to
protect whistleblowers, and additional procedures “to ensure the
integrity of scientific and technological information and processes”
relied on by the agency.308

302. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1646 (discussing the potential politicization of
OIGs).
303. For an excellent review of these policies, see Lin, supra note 294, at 37–40.
304. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies
(Mar. 9, 2009).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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It took over a year for the OSTP to develop scientific integrity
policies for the agencies to use in crafting their own policies. The OSTP
memorandum told the agencies to develop policies that “[e]nsur[ed] a
culture of scientific integrity.”309 Among other things, the
memorandum stressed that “[i]n no circumstances may public affairs
officers ask or direct Federal scientists to alter scientific findings.”310
Additionally, agency selection of members of advisory committees had
to be “based on expertise, knowledge, and contribution to the relevant
subject area.”311
Twenty-four departments and agencies promulgated scientific
integrity policies in response to the memorandum.312 EPA published its
policy in May 2011, and established a “Scientific Integrity Official to
champion scientific integrity throughout the Agency.”313 Among other
commitments, the EPA policy declared that it was “essential that
political or other officials not suppress or alter scientific findings.”314 It
further “[p]rohibit[ed] all EPA employees, including scientists,
managers, and other Agency leadership, from suppressing, altering, or
otherwise impeding the timely release of scientific findings or
conclusions.”315 It demanded that agency employees “act honestly and
refrain from acts of scientific misconduct,” which included
“fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism.”316 The policy “[r]ecognize[d]
the distinction between scientific information, analyses, and results
from the policy decisions made based on that scientific information,”
309. Memorandum from John P. Holdren to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1 (Dec.
17, 2010). Agencies were to “[s]trengthen the actual and perceived credibility of Government
research” by ensuring that the data used in decisionmaking underwent peer review, setting clear
standards governing conflicts of interest, and “adopting appropriate whistleblower protections.”
Id. at 1–2. Other goals were to “[f]acilitate the free flow of scientific and technological
information” and “[e]stablish principles for conveying scientific and technological information to
the public.” Id. at 2.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 3.
312. RASHIDA NEK & ANITA R. EISENSTADT, SCI. & TECH. POL’Y INST., REVIEW OF
FEDERAL AGENCY POLICIES ON SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY III (2016).
313. U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY 1 (2012); see also Hannah Hess, Science
Watchdog Investigating Pruitt’s CO2 Remarks, E&E NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.ee
news.net/eedaily/stories/1060052478/search?keyword=Science+Watchdog+Investigating+Pruitt’
s+CO2+Remarks [https://perma.cc/7SJT-MZLF]. The policy “reaffirm[ed] and promot[ed]
scientific integrity” by “supporting the culture of scientific integrity, enhancing transparency
within scientific processes, and protecting Agency scientists.” U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
POLICY, supra 313, at 3.
314. U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY, supra note 313, at 1.
315. Id. at 4.
316. Id.
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and it insisted that “quantitative conclusions . . . not be influenced by
possible risk management implications of the results.”317 Finally, the
policy extended the agency’s existing whistleblower protections to all
“employees who uncover or report allegations of scientific and
research misconduct, or who express a differing scientific opinion, from
retaliation or other punitive actions.”318
EPA’s program is considered a particularly rigorous one, in part
because it is one of the few that establishes an independent scientific
officer.319 EPA’s program also prohibits precisely the activities of
concern here that contribute to the political manipulation of science.320
However, enforcement of EPA’s scientific integrity policy is limited.
As Professor Lin observes, “EPA’s policy expressly states that it offers
internal guidance and creates no enforceable obligations.”321 Lin also
details a recent, failed effort to apply the policy against false statements
made by Administrator Pruitt.322 Lin concludes from this experience
that—aside from the lack of meaningful sanctions—even “establishing
a violation of EPA’s scientific integrity policy may not be easy.”323
As long as implementation of these scientific integrity policies is
triggered by self-policing and self-enforcement by agency employees,
their ability to protect against the manipulations described in Section I
will be limited at best. The scientific integrity officer can focus public
attention on violations of the policy through reports that are amplified
in the news media, but that appears to be the extent of their power. As
one USDA scientist candidly reported, its scientific integrity policy was
“kind of a nicety with no real meaning.”324

317. Id. at 3–4.
318. Id. at 5.
319. Kimberley A. Strassel, Anatomy of a Deep State, WALL STREET J., May 26, 2017, at A15.
The current occupant of that position, Francesca Grifo, a former advocate at the Union of
Concerned Scientists, has proactively promoted that topic by holding well-attended meetings and
workshops for agency employees and stakeholders. Zack Colman, Phone Lines Maxed Out for
Scientific Integrity Meeting, E&E NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/
2017/10/02/stories/1060062275 [https://perma.cc/W48A-YMY6].
320. See supra notes 313–18 and accompanying text.
321. Lin, supra note 294 (manuscript at 48).
322. Id. (manuscript at 48–49).
323. Id. (manuscript at 48).
324. Some Scientists Say Their Work Has Been Altered, E&E NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060053414/search?keyword=Some+Scientists+Say+T
heir+Work+Has+Been+Altered [https://perma.cc/YM6R-V3RX].
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2. Science Advisory Boards. Several regulatory statutes create
scientific advisory committees to review the work of agency scientists
and provide advice on regulatory issues, and agencies frequently create
science advisory boards on their own.325 A scientific advisory
committee can lend the patina of objectivity to science-based agency
decisions that can be very useful to an agency that is under attack in
the political arena.326 At the same time, we have observed a number of
instances—more than 30 percent of our accounts—in which scientific
advisory committees have blown the whistle on low visibility attempts
by upper-level decisionmakers to manipulate science to achieve
predetermined outcomes.327 In the course of judicial review, courts in
fact sometimes rely on criticisms by scientific advisory committees to
support conclusions that agency actions are arbitrary and capricious.328
EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, for example, has
on several occasions complained rather loudly that the administrator
ignored its advice on NAAQS in an effort to make the standards less
burdensome for the affected industries.329 A working group of EPA’s
Science Advisory Board circulated a memorandum in May 2018
containing recommendations for full board review of several of the
agency’s proposed deregulatory actions during the Trump
administration.330 The memorandum, which was reported in the trade
press,331 contained several rather strong criticisms of pending EPA
actions, including the Agency’s reconsideration of its final
determination of emissions standards for automobiles, national
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants for hydrochloric acid
production residual risk, and the repeal of emissions requirements for
325. See generally JASANOFF, supra note 207 (providing book-length treatment of the
operation of science advisory boards in the United States).
326. Id. at 206.
327. We categorized and tabulated all of our accounts in Part II that involved public
reprimands or sanctions for the executive branch’s manipulation of science. Of the twenty-two
documented incidents that involved public reprimands of some form by Congress, the courts
(through litigation), agency staff, or science advisory boards, seven (or 30 percent) involved
criticism from a science advisory board.
328. See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 521–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
329. See, e.g., supra notes 130–32, 144 and accompanying text.
330. Memorandum from Alison Cullen, Chair, Science Advisory Board (SAB) Work Group
on EPA Planned Actions for SAB Consideration of the Underlying Science, to Members of the
Chartered SAB and SAB Liaisons (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter Cullen Memorandum].
331. E.g., Marianne Lavelle, Pruitt’s Anti-Climate Agenda is Facing New Challenge from
Science Advisers, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (May 23, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
23052018/scott-pruitt-epa-climate-change-clean-power-plan-scientific-review-board-trumpadministration [http://perma.cc/9R64-WD6S].
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“glider” trucks.332 The working group pointedly noted a “trend” in
which the agency’s air office was providing less information to the
Scientific Advisory Board about planned actions333 in an apparent
effort to limit the Board’s input.
Yet once again, this particularly important shield against
politicization of science is limited by the reality that political
appointees usually though not always control when a science advisory
board is consulted and how that board is staffed. With the exception of
a few statutory programs,334 there are virtually no legal constraints over
these decisions. Even the composition of such boards is largely subject
to political manipulation.335
3. Staff. Career agency scientists provide another valuable
institutional check on manipulation by upper-level political
appointees. These career staffers can serve as the ballast that keeps the
agencies operating in accordance with professional norms that resist
ends-oriented political intrusions. The staff, whether or not its work is
disclosed to the public, still creates the initial scientific record to inform
policy; this record at least creates a speed bump that political
appointees must find a way around to advance ends-oriented policies.
In nearly half of the stealth tactics discussed in Part I, the role of
staff was pivotal in calling attention to the political manipulation of
science.336 Some career scientists have resisted political changes to their
analyses or conclusions.337 Other scientists have called attention to
attempted manipulations, sometimes by leaking the evidence and
documents to the press or posting them on the internet and sometimes
by formally blowing the whistle on inappropriate actions.338 Moreover,
332. Cullen Memorandum, supra note 330, at 3, Table 1.
333. Id. at 7.
334. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2012).
335. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and Federal Advisory Committees, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1454, 1456 (2004) (discussing criticisms of the George W. Bush administration
for stacking science advisory committees).
336. In our categorization and tabulation referenced in supra note 327, ten out of the twentytwo documented incidents involved some form of public reporting or whistleblowing by the
agency staff themselves.
337. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text.
338. Zack Colman, Climate Study Quietly Underway Warns of Severe U.S. Impacts, E&E
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060058498/search?keyword
=Climate+Study+Quietly+Underway+Warns [http://perma.cc/NV65-KEU4]; John H. Cushman,
Jr., Speaking Truth to Power on Climate Change: Why the U.S. Report Leaked, INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS (Aug. 9, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/09082017/climate-change-sciencereport-leaked-truth [http://perma.cc/NAU9-659L].
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when career staffers are called upon for explanations by Congress,
some have been quite forthright in acknowledging efforts by political
officials to meddle with the scientific record underlying regulations.339
The group Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
(“PEER”) also uses reports from existing staff to probe into agency
decisions. PEER files a FOIA request about once every three weeks,
often to probe matters brought to its attention by government
employees.340 Another group, called “314 Action,” has established a
secure hotline and an encrypted email drop through which government
scientists can report abuses to lawyers and receive advice on their legal
options.341
In some cases, these staff reports can lead to adverse consequences
for the offending political appointees. When Assistant Interior
Secretary Julie MacDonald was caught bullying scientific staff into
changing their scientific analyses involving endangered species, for
example, the DOI’s Inspector General documented her activities and
she resigned.342
Former agency staffers can also serve as valuable informants on
the manipulation of science after they retire from service. One group
of former EPA staffers, for example, has formed an organization called
the “Environmental Protection Network” to keep an eye on that
agency’s activities and comment publicly on abuses when its members
detect them.343 Among other things, it wrote a lengthy critique of
Administrator Pruitt’s “transparency” proposal.344
But even with these important innovations, there are limits to
what the career staff can accomplish. Political bullying of agency
339. One EPA senior science adviser testified before Congress, for example, that EPA
Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances asked her to employ a risk
assessment model based on a scientific theory that she had never heard of to ensure a smaller risk
estimate for the fumigant ethylene dibromide. LASH, supra note 53, at 173.
340. Amanda Reilly, Group, Firm Offer Pro Bono Help for Federal Scientists, E&E NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060064627/search?keyword=Group
%2C+Firm+Offer+Pro+Bono+Help+for+Federal+Scientists [http://perma.cc/TD9W-ZY3J].
341. Nick Bowlin, Political Group Seeks Federal Whistleblowers, E&E NEWS (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/1060065401/search?keyword=Political+Group+Seeks+F
ederal+Whistleblowers [http://perma.cc/M2NX-ED6W].
342. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY 1–8 (2008).
343. About Us, ENVTL. PROTECTION NETWORK, https://www.environmentalprotection
network.org/about [http://perma.cc/2R7V-XEE6].
344. ENVTL. PROTECTION NETWORK, COMMENTS ON EPA’S CENSORED SCIENCE
PROPOSAL (2018), https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/
08/EPN-Censored-Science-Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7TY-BCHA].
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scientists can still lead to scientifically compromised decisions. The
White House has demanded changes to scientific records that even
strong career staffers were not able to prevent.345 Moreover, since the
political officials decide what counts as “deliberative process”
privilege, the staff would seem relatively helpless—short of filing
formal whistleblower complaints—to expose these tactics to the light
of day.
D. The Scientific Community and the Media
The scientific community has been heavily involved in publicizing
and disciplining political manipulation of science in the agencies.346 The
UCS, editors of top scientific journals, and respected scientists have
penned reports, articles, commentaries, and editorials that document
numerous problems.347 Soon after the 2016 elections, for example,
“[m]ore than 2,300 scientists, including twenty-two Nobel Prize
winners, [wrote] an open letter to President-elect Donald Trump and
the 115th Congress, urging them to adhere to high standards of
scientific integrity and independence” in addressing environmental
problems.348 Scientists are working with public relations experts to
hone their communications skills to facilitate interactions with the
public and the media.349 The annual meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science in February 2017 featured
a panel on “Defending Science and Scientific Integrity in the Age of
Trump.”350

345. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text.
346. Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 697–98. See generally David P. Clarke, Sound Science or
Political Science? Federal Agencies Respond to Trump, 34 ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 2017 (noting
scientists’ attempt at pushing back against Trump Administration’s attempt at politicizing and
ignoring science).
347. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 276; Goldman et al., supra note 6, at 696–97; Jonathan
M. Samet, Thomas A. Burke & Bernard D. Goldstein, The Trump Administration and the
Environment — Heed the Science, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1182, 1186 (2017).
348. Juliet Eilperin & Chris Mooney, Over 2,000 Scientists Urge Trump to Respect ‘Scientific
Integrity and Independence’, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016) (quoting Letter from Union of
Concerned Scientists to President-Elect Trump and the 115th Congress (Nov. 30, 2016)),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/30/22-nobel-prizewinners-urge-trump-to-respect-scientific-integrity-and-independence/?noredirect=on&ut%E2
%80%A6&utm_term=.7c7fe8b38788 [http://perma.cc/QYT3-WRG7].
349. Debra Kahn, Scientists Fearing Trump ‘Lobotomy’ Clamor to Speak Out, E&E NEWS
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060049090/search?keyword=
Scientists+Fearing+Trump+%E2%80%9CLobotomy%E2%80%9D+Clamor+to+Speak+Out
[http://perma.cc/7XMA-TZPR].
350. Lindzi Wessel, Hundreds Rally for Science at Demonstration near AAAS Meeting,
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The March for Science that took place on Earth Day, 2017 in
Washington D.C.—in the pouring rain—and 600 other cities
throughout the world demonstrated a willingness of scientists and their
supporters to defend the integrity of government science despite their
historic reluctance to engage in politics.351 The clear message of the
march—which was sponsored by a number of mainline scientific
organizations, including the American Geophysical Union—was that
many people “want government policies built on evidence and reason,
not ideology.”352 A recent study showed that speaking out against
abuses of science does not undermine the credibility of the scientists
who do so.353
Persistent investigative journalists in the mainstream media and
the trade press are responsible for documenting most of the instances
of manipulation identified in Part I. Even here, however, there are
limits to what journalists can accomplish. In some cases, reporters for
certain news outlets have been barred from covering government
events.354 In any event, like the proverbial tree that falls unheard in the
forest, if there is no attentive or powerful audience to hear the stories,
adverse news coverage will not go very far in disciplining these
practices.
Even if scathing criticisms of the political manipulation of science
and publication of abuse in the media activate a larger public to clamor
for change, the elected president and sitting Congress can nonetheless
choose to ignore or even discredit such efforts as “junk science” and
SCIENCE (Feb. 19, 2017, 6:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/hundreds-rallyscience-demonstration-near-aaas-meeting [http://perma.cc/BTQ2-RK8M] (emphasis omitted).
351. See Joel Achenbach, Ben Guarino & Sarah Kaplan, Why People are Marching for
Science: ‘There is No Planet B’, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/big-turnout-expected-for-march-for-science-in-dc/2017/04/21/67cf7f90237f-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html?utm_term=.21499f7a93bb
[https://perma.cc/D395PULK]; John H. Cushman, Jr., Tens of Thousands March for Science and Against Threats to
Climate Research, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
22042017/march-for-science-scientists-climate-change-donald-trump-climate-denial [http://
perma.cc/SA3F-DND5].
352. Cushman, Jr., supra note 351; Wessel, supra note 350.
353. Hannah Hess, Clarion Call for Scientists: ‘Use Your Voice . . . Or Lose It’, E&E NEWS
(June 22, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060056452/search?keyword=Clarion
+Call+for+Scientists%3A+%E2%80%9CUse+Your+Voice+.+.+.+Or+Lose+It [http://perma.cc
/354R-9J5G] (citing John E. Kotcher, Teresa A. Myers, Emily K. Vraga, Neil Stenhouse &
Edward W. Maibach, Does Engagement in Advocacy Hurt the Credibility of Scientists? Results
from a Randomized National Survey Experiment, 11 ENVTL. COMM. 415 (2017)).
354. See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Jaclyn Peiser, Three Reporters Are Turned Away from an
E.P.A. Event, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/
reporters-epa-event.html [http://perma.cc/AKV3-CBEN].
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“fake news.” As with all of the tools described above, change can only
come after the public reacts to reports of abuse and demands change.
Even then, change may have to await the next election cycle, at which
point dozens of other critical issues may have crowded out regulatory
agency abuse of science on the electorate’s policy agenda.
III. REFORM
Given the limited deterrents to political manipulation of science
in regulatory decisionmaking, the fact that it sometimes occurs should
not be surprising. Indeed, the accounts detailed in Part I may only
represent the tip of the iceberg since, from the standpoint of most
political appointees, the choice between failing the president and
risking censure for politicizing science is often a simple one.
Appointees’ careers suffer if they cannot advance the administration’s
agenda and their professional ambitions often appear to dovetail with
their own ideological commitments. As Phil Cooney, the former chief
of staff of the White House Council on Environmental Quality under
George W. Bush who edited climate change reports,355 observed:
“When I came to the White House, my loyalties – my sole loyalties –
were to the President and his administration.”356 Political appointees
also generally plan to work in the agency for a limited time and find it
easy to move to lucrative opportunities in private sector jobs when
their government service is over.357 Even appointees who are
terminated early for violating a scientific integrity policy to advance a

355. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
356. Allegations of Political Interference with Government Climate Change Science: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 327 (2007) (statement of Philip
Cooney, former Chief of Staff, White House Council on Environmental Quality). Even when the
results are personally embarrassing, the terminated appointee can remain loyal to the mission,
although perhaps not to the president. As Anne Gorsuch, a former EPA administrator who
resigned in the wake of scandals occurring during her tenure, observed in her memoir: “When
congressional criticism about the EPA began to touch the presidency, Mr. Reagan solved his
problem by jettisoning me and my people, people whose only ‘crime’ was loyal service, following
orders.” Patricia Sullivan, Anne Gorsuch Burford, 62, Dies, WASH. POST (July 22, 2004),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2004/07/22/anne-gorsuch-burford-62-dies/
78b89129-728a-404e-8550-7b5617d5f291/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c2eddfe337c [https://
perma.cc/GK95-FTN3]
357. See, e.g., Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Financial Industry: 1909-2006, at 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14644,
2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/w14644.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MCV-G3T3] (observing that
“[g]iven the wage premia that we document, it was impossible for regulators to attract and retain
highly-skilled financial workers, because they could not compete with private sector wages”).
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deregulatory agenda may be greeted with open arms in the private
sector.
These strong incentives operating on political appointees to
manipulate science make it difficult to devise penalties that adequately
change their behavior. Self-restraint and after-the-fact sanctions,
including termination of appointees, seem insufficient to deter the
temptation to meddle with the technical analysis to advance the
president’s agenda.
The most promising antidote thus involves fortifying agency
decisionmaking processes proactively to impede this ends-oriented
manipulation of science. Politically appointed officials seeking to
adjust the scientific record must not be allowed simply to pick up the
phone, walk down the hall, or issue a directive ordering the agency’s
scientists to adjust analyses to support predetermined outcomes.
Instead, agency decisionmaking procedures should insulate the career
staff from political interference at this particularly crucial stage of its
expert work.
To help ensure that regulatory decisionmaking reflects the best
available science, we therefore recommend that the decisionmaking
process be reconceptualized in a way that provides scientific
independence for the expert staff at the first stage of literature
synthesis.358 In this reimagined institutional blueprint, the scientific and
technical staffs’ analysis of the relevant scientific information would be
published as an initial assessment, and the staff would be separated by
firewalls from the rest of the decisionmaking process while preparing
that analysis. Political appointees attempting to influence the initial
assessment in violation of the firewalls would suffer significant adverse
consequences for their reputations and future employment.
A bifurcation of the decisionmaking process and firewalling of the
initial scientific analysis does not require the staff to separate “science”
from “policy,” because the technical analysis will usually uncover
significant uncertainties, the resolution of which will involve a
combination of scientific and policy judgment.359 But a rigorous
358. For some literature in accord with this view, see, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1640–
48, and David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
439 (2002).
359. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in
Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and
OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979) (discussing the significant policy choices in science-intensive
regulatory questions); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) (same).
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technical analysis does involve separating out the understanding of the
“facts” in the existing record and identifying the uncertainties in the
scientific data and models. In our reformed process, the career staff
would become insulated, like other neutral advisors (for example
judges and prosecutors), from outside influence so they can do this
work in as “neutral” a fashion as possible. Moreover, these firewalls
would be clear, visible, and enforced to impede efforts at tweaking the
science or dictating new procedures at the outset. Political appointees,
policy staff, and the White House would still be able to reject,
distinguish, correct, or ignore this scientific record. And they would still
determine the content of the policy that the agency uses in resolving
uncertainties in the scientific and technical information. But unlike the
current institutional design in most agencies, the staff’s version of the
relevant scientific information would be documented and serve as the
record for judicial review. Politically appointed officials would have to
grapple with this record and could no longer change it.
This final Section discusses the literature that supports the general
idea of firewalls that separate the initial technical analysis from the
larger policy decision. It then offers preliminary suggestions for how to
operationalize this new blueprint for regulatory decisionmaking
involving science and policy and identifies various questions and
concerns that should be considered moving forward.
A. Firewalling the Scientific Literature Review and Analysis from
Policy Input
At the end of her comprehensive analysis of the politicization of
environmental science during the George W. Bush administration,
Professor Holly Doremus concludes that “[t]he single biggest
contributor to the lack of political integrity in this administration’s
environmental-policy decisions is the absence of barriers between
political appointees who view their mission as the single-minded
advancement of the President’s policy agenda and career employees
charged with providing scientific advice or analysis.”360 We agree.
Virtually all of the stealth science strategies discussed in Part I
involve political manipulations during this early stage of agency
analysis, when the staff synthesizes the existing scientific literature that
bears on the issues that arise in a rulemaking. In these scientific
manipulations, staffers are censored, edited, constrained, depleted, or

360. Doremus, supra note 124, at 1640.
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their work is reviewed by potentially biased experts. The target in these
stealth-science strategies is consistently the underlying scientific
record. The object is to alter it so that the “facts” are consistent with
deregulatory policies in ways that do not encounter legal impediments
or serious public opposition.
The solution must therefore take the form of stronger barriers
between the technical analysts and the political appointees at this early
step when the scientific and technical analysis is being conducted.
Nearly every regulatory decision of any consequence by an agency
involved in health, safety, or environmental regulation begins with a
literature search and synthesis of the available information that speaks
to issues relevant to the decision.361 This step—whether separated
explicitly in the agency decision process or not—involves
characterizing the existing scientific literature and highlighting any
remaining gaps, uncertainties, and open questions relevant to the issues
raised by the regulation.362
Given executive incentives, the best way to institute this firewall
is through passage of a new “regulatory science” law. The law would
be brief and serve as a type of meta-administrative law statute that
legally prescribes a bifurcated process for informal rulemakings,
guidances, and other formal agency decisions.363 Specifically, the law
would instruct that when agencies integrate scientific information into
their assessments, they must provide assurances that the information is
assessed and analyzed by agency expert staff with complete
independence from the political process, even while the inevitable
nonscientific choices and framing in the technical assessments are
carefully explicated.364 Equally important, this more specific directive
361. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 111–12.
362. Id. at 120–23.
363. Several other regulatory science laws have in fact been passed or proposed over the last
decade, although these laws are problematic both in their scope and demands on the agencies.
See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher, & Pasky Pascual, Whose Science? A New Era in
Regulatory “Science Wars,” 362 SCIENCE 636, 636 & 38 (2018) (describing the Honest Act passed
by the House in 2017).
364. Such an approach thus sidesteps disagreements about what is “science” and what is
“policy.” In the first instance, the technical staff identifies and assesses the entire technical record.
This work will necessarily include nonscientific considerations, but the staff (and peer reviewers)
will be expected to identify the materials they considered and explain them clearly. There may be
disagreements between management and the technical staff about both the science and the other
inevitable judgments, but the point is simply to use this bifurcated process to bring them out into
the open. Rather than allowing political officials full access to the staff assessments before they
are made public, the firewall provides a clearer window inside the sequential process, including
identifying authorship and attribution which otherwise is lost under the current nonprocedural
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for the use of science would be enforced through judicial review.
Courts would be tasked with reviewing challenges to the agency’s
fidelity to the firewalls, as well as to the requirement that the agency
clearly explain how the agency assessed the relevant scientific
information and trace the role it played in the final decision. This legal
mandate would thus provide a sharper focus for the courts’ review of
science than is currently present in judicial review of agency
rulemakings.365
1. Support for Firewalls. Diverse prominent committees and
theorists converge on the wisdom of insulating the initial staff analysis
of the literature and evidence from later decisions about whether or
how that scientific record should inform policy. The clearest statement
of this principle comes from the NAS’s “Red Book,” published in 1983
and commissioned specifically to speak to the optimal organizational
design of agencies with respect to resolving science-policy questions.366
Although the Red Book was most influential in underscoring the many
uncertainties and judgments that populate risk assessments, making
the separation of science and policy impossible as a practical matter,367
a close look at the report also reveals that the Committee on the
Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health, in the
National Research Council, believed that for purposes of agency
decisionmaking, it was still beneficial to conceive of and structure the
agency analysis in two distinct steps.368 The first step involves the
synthesis and characterization of the scientific literature, a
characterization that would include identifying uncertainties,
approach to science integration used in a number of agency programs.
365. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 145, at 2068. Of course, ensuring the judicial remedies are
significant enough to change the incentives of the political actors is also important. We discuss
sanctions for political officials at infra notes 400–03. On the agency side of the ledger, the remedies
also need to be sufficient to encourage agency staff compliance. The article by Rob Glicksman
and Emily Hammond provides superb attention to this neglected topic. See generally Robert L.
Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68
DUKE L.J. 1651 (2019) (discussing courts’ remedial options in instances of what the authors term
“regulatory slop”).
366. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH,
COMM’N ON LIFE SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., RISK ASSESSMENT
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 2–3 (1983) [hereinafter NAS, RED
BOOK].
367. See, e.g., Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy
Divorce, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 99, 99
(Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) (discussing artificial separation of risk
assessment and risk management, as well as the problems that separation creates).
368. NAS, RED BOOK, supra note 366, at 2–3.
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variability, and other open questions left for policy judgment.369 This is
the “risk assessment.” The second step would then entail decisions
about whether or how to use that factual record.370 In the Committee’s
view, this separation was vital to ensure the quality of the agency’s
science-based decisions:
When a fully documented written risk assessment is not produced
before an agency’s decision to regulate or not to regulate, it is difficult
to understand the process by which an agency made its assessment.
The Committee believes that the creation of such a document
encourages public understanding of and respect for agency
procedures and provides a basis for review by a scientific advisory
panel.371

The Committee also believed that this type of rigorous two-step
process would help make the policy choices clearer. In the Committee’s
words, “a detailed risk assessment document that clearly identifies the
inference options chosen in the assessment and explains the rationale
for those choices will help to maintain a sharper distinction between
the science and policy.” This sequential analysis, when done properly,
helps to “guard against the inappropriate intrusion of risk management
[i.e., overt policy] considerations” into the agency’s assessment of the
relevant scientific literature.372
Work in the academic field known as “public administration,” as
well as related legal literature on institutional design, provides similar
support for this type of distinction between the initial technical analysis
and later policy discussions.373 As then-Judge Breyer observed, “[a]
depoliticized regulatory process [that is based in expertise,

369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
372. Id. Thus, while the Committee was not enthusiastic about devising a separate, centralized
technical unit within government to do this work throughout the report the committee
consistently treated and discussed these two steps of analysis and “management” (or policy
decisions) as distinct analytically in the decision process. See id. at 6, 139–40, 143. Considerable
attention was paid, for example, to developing rigorous peer review of the agency’s technical and
scientific analyses (but not the “management”). See, e.g., id. at 144–45 (discussing the functions
of review panels).
373. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (discussing how agencies’ experience,
appreciation of complexities and policies, and responsible treatment of the facts “justif[y] the use
of the administrative process”); see also, e.g., H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, KEVIN B. SMITH,
CHRISTOPHER W. LARIMER & MICHAEL J. LICARI, THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY
PRIMER 2 (2d ed. 2012) (identifying as one of the “elemental features of public administration”
individual competence, “which include[s] . . . expertise”).
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rationalization, and insulation] might produce better results, hence
increased confidence, leading to more favorable public and
Congressional reactions.”374 This critical agency independence is
generally satisfied by staffing the agency with career professionals and
then requiring those professionals to meet high analytical standards,
including identifying the question at hand, explaining their analyses,
and subjecting their work to review by experts before policymakers are
involved.375 In this way, “political influence should not undermine the
deliberative benefits that agency rulemaking delivers.”376
Finally, the expert agency—by definition—brings technical tools
and expertise to the table that otherwise might be lacking. Although
these experts do not have magic answers and their technical analyses
are rife with judgments and human biases, the collective work is
constrained by professional norms and methodological rules. Their
work is also by nature inquisitorial rather than adversarial.377 The
technical staff seeks out the best understanding of the problem and the
best options. And their work will be scrutinized by other technical
experts with similar standards and demands.
2. Precedent for a Firewall. Although the notion of a firewall
around an initial technical assessment may seem radical and even
fanciful, there is considerable precedent for the concept. In one of

374. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 55–56, 59–60 (1993).
375. See, e.g., FREDERICKSON ET AL., supra note 373, at 2 (identifying as one of the elemental
principles of public administration “the organization as distinct from the persons holding
positions or offices in it”). “Politics” and “administration,” just like “science” and “policy” cannot
be separated cleanly, id. at 98, but that is a different issue than separating agency choices from
White House choices, which goes to the institutional source of control rather than the nature of
the substantive issues at stake. Indeed, the control-of-bureaucracy theory identifies two
competing models—one being an agency controlled by political actors and one made by
administration actors. See, e.g., id. at 16 (elaborating on control-of-bureaucracy theory).
376. Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1451 (2013); see also Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory
State, 27 J.L. & SOC. 38, 55 (2000) (touting the importance of checks and balances in which
“opposed maximizers” hold one another in check); cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY 83–89 (2007) (describing a similar, sometimes 100-person intra-agency discourse
arising within the executive intelligence community to check against group think and collectively
work through difficult security challenges).
377. See generally Robert J. MacCoun, The Epistemic Contract: Fostering an Appropriate
Level of Public Trust in Experts, in MOTIVATING COOPERATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH
AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE (Brian H. Bornstein &
Alan J. Tomkins, eds. 2015) (developing the concept of adversarial versus inquisitorial
approaches in science-policy).
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EPA’s most successful programs, the NAAQS standard-setting
process, EPA divides the scientific analysis of the relevant scientific
research into four separate reports that fit neatly within our suggested
process.378 Each of these reports provides a different, focused analysis
of the existing literature and is prepared by EPA’s technical staff.379
And each of the reports is both publicly reviewed and peer reviewed
and published as a stand-alone report.380 The scientific staff is also
firewalled from political and policy interference; no ex parte contact is
allowed from political officials while the staff conducts the literature
search and analysis, although there can be meetings on the record.381
A second analog for the firewall comes from the world of science
research, where authorship, attribution, and independence are central
prerequisites to publication.382 Some universities are quite vigilant
about barring faculty researchers from signing contracts that give
funding sponsors a right to control the research.383 Research
independence is paramount to quality science. These “no strings”
policies all seek to position researchers in the purest possible
inquisitorial mode.
A final analog comes from firewalls instated in institutions with
the similar goal of insulating fact finders or “impartial”
decisionmakers, like judges, from influence by those who have a stake
in the decisionmaking outcome.384 Within the executive branch, entire
enforcement units of the Department of Justice are walled off from
378. See WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 36, 39–40 (detailing EPA’s NAAQS
process).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 37, 39.
381. Id. at 39–40 (discussing NAAQS alignment with agency policy assessments over political
interests).
382. See, e.g., Defining the Role of Authors and Contributors, INT’L COMM. OF MED. J.
EDITORS,
http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/definingthe-role-of-authors-and-contributors.html [https://perma.cc/34WZ-67EX] (“Authorship confers
credit and has important academic, social, and financial implications.”). See generally Conflicts of
Interest, INT’L COMM. OF MED. J. EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/conflicts-of-interest
[https://perma.cc/7UGA-FM4X] (offering an illustration of one of these conflicts of interest
forms).
383. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho, Ryo Shohara, Anna Schissel & Drummond Rennie, Policies
on Faculty Conflicts of Interest at US Universities, 284 JAMA 2203, 2203 (2000) (finding that 55
percent of policies required faculty disclosures and 19 percent specified limits on faculty financial
interests in corporate sponsors of research).
384. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); see also
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1951) (holding that decisions/factfinding
by a hearing officer become part of the relevant record for “substantial evidence” review even if
otherwise overtaken by decisions/factfinding by the agency head(s)).
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political officials through “limited contacts” policies that bar
communications between the White House and enforcement
personnel on specific cases.385 As a recent report by the Brennan
Center explains:
These policies recognize that political actors are, at least in part,
motivated by political concerns that should not affect the application
of the law and that law enforcement personnel are better situated to
make decisions about specific cases or investigations. They guard
against overt direction from the White House, or the use of investigative agencies to punish political foes. They also protect against the
inadvertent pressure or bias that may result from a call from a White
House official about a specific matter. Even a question about a case
can lead an official to presume an interest in its outcome; the official
then may try to ensure the desired outcome. As former Attorney
General Benjamin Civiletti put it, presidents and other top officials
“unintentionally can exert pressure by the very nature of their
positions.”386

The Brennan Center report also notes, however, that “[u]nfortunately,
it has become increasingly clear that these voluntary policies, without
formal legal requirements or enforcement mechanisms, cannot prevent
political interference in law enforcement activities.”387 Yet the
existence of these policies suggest that it is possible to construct a
firewall within the bureaucracy to keep politics out of sensitive matters
that demand objectivity.
3. Practical Implementation. With the basic concept in place, we
now turn to how an agency might actually accomplish the redesign of
agency decisionmaking in practice. Although many options are
available, we propose three specific reforms to the existing law and
agency practice. The reforms consist of: a formal firewall around the
agency staff’s initial technical analysis, which would be published

385. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, to White House Staff
1 (Jan. 16, 1996) (“Unless you are certain that a particular contact is permissible, you should take
care before making the contact to consult with the Counsel’s Office.”); see also Memorandum
from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to All White House Staff 1 (Jan. 27, 2017)
(“Communications with DOJ about individual cases or investigations should be routed through
the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or Solicitor
General, unless the Counsel’s Office approves different procedures for the specific case at
issue.”).
386. PREET BHARARA ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON RULE OF
LAW & DEMOCRACY, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 18 (2018).
387. Id.
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separately; more rigorous legal controls on the establishment of
scientific advisory boards and the selection of peer reviewers by
political appointees; and revisions to the rules governing the
deliberative process exemption to the FOIA. The most important by
far is our first suggested reform—proposing a formal firewall for the
technical analysis. But all three reforms are important and ideally
would be instituted simultaneously. This part closes with a discussion
of the future issues and challenges that lie ahead for such a project,
including the obvious question of the political feasibility of this reform.
a. Design of the Firewall. Our proposal draws institutional
boundaries around agency experts to preserve the integrity of their
initial scientific assessment. In proposing this firewall we reiterate that
we are not naively assuming that science and policy are cleanly
separable. However, the evidence amassed in this Article supports the
view that the work of the technical staff and that of the political
management are distinctive and distinguisable. At base, then, our
proposal simply seeks to keep these two sources of analysis separate in
a way that allows others to understand the contributions of technical
staff versus the contributions of political officials. This separation is
accomplished by introducing mechanisms to ensure the transparency
and responsibility of authorship. Moreover, in proposing this kind of
firewall, we seek to place primary responsibility for the initial technical
assessment with agency staff rather than political officials. This
placement of the technical analysis with agency experts still appreciates
that the technical synthesis will entail considerable judgment. Indeed,
that recognition simply places more onus on the staff to explain their
discretionary choices as best they can. Other checks and balances we
propose will help hold the expert staff accountable for accomplishing
this difficult task honestly.
More specifically, we propose that in any covered agency action,
the professional staff’s literature search and analysis of the existing
scientific literature should be published as a separate report before the
agency’s policy analysis begins. The work of the agency staff in
producing this initial report, but not their work afterwards, would also
be firewalled from all political communications. Both features of this
reform should be legislated and codified in enforceable rules that
create severe sanctions for meddling with this sacrosanct stage of the
agency’s analysis.
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The firewall would include the following steps:
Framing the Charge. The “charge” or factual questions the
technical staff needs to research would be driven by the agency’s
statute or the subject matter of the regulation being promulgated. The
questions that frame the scientific analysis must be stated clearly at the
outset, and they will likely be formulated by the policy staff and/or
political appointees. To that end, the agency could hold a scoping
meeting to assist in crafting the charge for the technical assessment.388
The resulting draft charge to the technical staff could even be subject
to notice and comment, as is currently the case currently under the
NAAQS process.389
Moreover, although it will also often be useful to engage the
technical staff to assist in framing the question, the staff’s role at this
stage would be placed on the record. Politically appointed officials
could convene meetings protected by the deliberative process
privilege, but when technical staff who will be charged with conducting
the work are involved at the framing stage, all discussions would have
to be recorded and be made public.390
Publishing the Staff’s Technical Report. Once it has received the
agency’s charge, the career scientific staff would be solely responsible
for conducting a comprehensive literature search and analysis of the
information relevant to the questions.391 The career staff’s initial report
would synthesize the literature as it pertained to the questions at hand,
highlighting not only the points of convergence but also the remaining
open questions, uncertainties, and variability.392 This analysis could

388. WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 32 (describing a “kick-off” workshop and
planning report).
389. Shapiro, Fisher, &Wagner, supra note 180, at 493–94 (outlining this scoping step under
the NAAQS process).
390. Wagner, supra note 145, at 2066 (describing this step and the supportive literature in
more detail).
391. Ideally, a detailed firewall protocol could be crafted by the NAS or some independent
group and would itself be firewalled from political officials. The protocol could be codified as a
regulation that is binding on the agency and perhaps could even be enforced by third parties.
Adjustments to this procedural set of rules would require notice and comment and could be
litigated. Congress could even establish the terms of how these firewall-design rules should be
prepared to ensure that they are both rigorous and will help protect the independence of staff
scientists. However they are created, it is important to have clear rules that define and protect the
staff workers from intervention through a relatively specific firewall mechanism. Cf. Doremus,
supra note 124, at 1645 (emphasizing the importance of rules in this context as well).
392. See, e.g., id. at 1646 (recommending reforming the politicization of science by “requiring
the preparation and release of reports signed by career technical employees at the outset of the
regulatory process”).
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also include developing computational models that provide different
scenarios and identify underlying assumptions. The staff’s work would
be insulated from any ex parte contact from policy officials and
political appointees,393 and written documentation of any
communications between technical staff and others within or outside
the agency would be placed in the record.394 The staff’s final analysis
would be published as a publicly available report. To increase
accountability and to motivate staff experts, authorship and attribution
should be afforded all analysts for individual contributions in the
report. The record should also contain the identities of any peer
reviewers, along with documentation of their contribution to the
review.395 Ideally, opportunities for dissent among staff should also be
provided, perhaps at the close of the full report or each section within
the report.396
Peer Review of the Technical Report. It is important to gather
outside expert reviews of the staff’s technical report to ensure
complete, rigorous, and accurate use of the literature and identification
of uncertainties. This peer review would be conducted by the very top
experts with as few ties as possible to the overarching policy
outcomes.397 The extent and nature of the peer review will vary. For
393. See, e.g., id. (similarly proposing “requiring the preparation and release of reports signed
by career technical employees at the outset of the regulatory process, or explicitly requiring that
the inputs of scientific staff into decision-making processes be included in administrative records
and made subject to FOIA”).
394. See, e.g., id. at 1646–47 (proposing this type of requirement); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 96 (2006) (stressing that earlier
involvement of OIRA into agency rulemakings requires transparency, ideally implemented as
docketed communications).
395. See, e.g., WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 36, 129–32. Attribution should also
be afforded for peer reviewers, and all comments should be on the record. Unlike journal peer
review which concerns individual actors and benefits from anonymity, when what is at stake is the
integrity of an agency technical analysis that informs public policy, all scientists should be able to
stand behind their work and comments.
396. Id. at 132–35 (describing a formal dissent process at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and recommending it be adopted more widely within the Executive branch); see also Doremus,
supra note 124, at 1645–46 (suggesting a similar type of dissent process for highlighting problems
internally).
397. We do not agree with former EPA Administrator Pruitt that experts who have grants or
contracts with EPA should be excluded from the pool of peer reviewers for that reason. Letter
from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, EPA, to Assistant Adm’rs, Reg’l Adm’rs & Office of Gen. Counsel
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/final_draft_fac_
memo-10.30.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N4Z-XL53]. We cannot see how working with EPA to
answer important empirical questions relevant to regulatory issues could possibly bias a scientist
for or against the staff’s position on a particular scientific question, especially in a deregulatory
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particularly significant questions, the report could be reviewed by an
advisory board. For smaller projects, the agency could solicit individual
reviewers to provide reviews.398 In all cases, however, the reviewers
should represent the best experts with the least conflicts of interest in
the matters at hand.399
Enforcement. As a legal matter, the firewall would need to be a
legislative creation that could be rigorously enforced.400 Government
officials who violate the terms of the firewall must be sanctioned
severely.401 Sanctions would range from public admonishment to
termination of employment with civil fines. An investigation that
uncovers a violation would also have to consider how to reconfigure
the process in a way that protects the firewall against similar intrusions
in the future.
Additional mechanisms for institutional oversight will likely be
needed, given the difficulty of ensuring compliance. For example,
Congress or the agencies may also task science-integrity offices with
actively monitoring interactions between politically appointed officials
(including White House officials) and scientific and technical staff to
ensure staff independence at this initial technical stage. Even informal
methods—like leaks to journalists and Congress—can help focus
political attention on nontransparent encroachments by upper-level

administration in which the staff and upper-level political decisionmakers may not agree on
regulatory outcomes.
398. See WAGNER, ACUS Study, supra note 111, at 113–15 (discussing these various options
in more detail).
399. The goal of this peer review step is to subject the staff analysis to a second look by a
group of experts who are external to the agency. We are cognizant of the fact that this second
group, however constituted, will also offer their critique with black-boxed expert judgments that
remain hidden from public view. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 207, at 157–59. However,
precisely for these same reasons, a second expert review of the staff analysis is better than no
critical review at all. And, of course, once the staff report (and peer review comments) are
introduced to the full range of agency decisionmakers and stakeholders, there will be further
scrutiny applied to possible hidden judgments embedded in the analysis because of the adversarial
nature of the proceedings.
400. See, e.g., BHARARA ET AL., supra note 386, at 17–19 (calling for the same approaches to
“limited contacts” policies used as firewalls in enforcement cases).
401. Enforcement would most often be triggered by employee complaints (including
anonymous complaints), which would trigger an investigation from a science integrity unit in the
agency or the inspector general. Employees whose complaints are judged frivolous by an
independent investigator could also be subject to sanctions, including possible termination. Cf. id.
at 20 (recommending that for limited contacts policies, “Congress should establish a clear
mechanism within the executive branch for investigating instances of inappropriate interference
with law enforcement for political or personal ends” and suggesting that these offices should be
existing offices of inspector generals).
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policymakers and White House officials into the staff’s scientific
analyses. These news leaks have played an important role in
disciplining abuses in the past, and they can continue to serve this role
in the future.402 Because staff self-reporting of inappropriate political
interventions is likely to remain an important ingredient to meaningful
reform, agencies should vigorously maintain whistleblower
protections.403
To further reinforce effective enforcement of the firewall, agency
scientific assessment programs should be audited periodically by some
independent observer like the NAS. In addition to identifying
problems, these independent assessments should help improve how the
agencies design and implement firewalls. Particularly in the early years,
these audits are likely to be quite important.
The Management Firewall. The entire operation of the scientific
and technical staff and the agency’s scientific integrity office should be
located inside the firewall to protect them from political interference.
The management of these technical personnel—their budget, their
assignments, and their hiring and firing—should also be protected by
the firewall.404 Career managers would do the hiring and firing, make
the assignments, and propose annual budgets that could be considered,
alongside the administration’s proposal, by Congress.405 These
managers would not report to personnel within the agency, but instead
to an independent unit, perhaps even a new agency in the
Congressional Research Service or the GAO that retains
independence from the executive branch. The hiring of these key
career managers would also be managed by this outside, independent

402. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 461, 478 (2010) (suggesting that expert analysts should always be allowed to speak
publicly about their work). Again, at least in the area of national security, the use of leaks has
been quite valuable in highlighting internal process problems. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 376,
at 72.
403. See, e.g., KITROSSER, supra note 279, at 126–27 (discussing external and internal checks,
such as whistleblower protections and less restricted communications between agency scientists
and the public, that can be placed to improve information integrity in the executive branch).
404. Managers would also be responsible for filing detailed annual reports that make their
decisions transparent, including decisions about staffing priorities, the staff’s fidelity to the
firewall (along with reports of breaches), the staff’s performance, and other details. Staff would
be invited to comment on the reports to ensure they are as factually accurate as possible.
405. Thus, while the political officials will ultimately decide budgets for the entire agency,
even at this step the career managers will identify their priorities and make their case. This
information will be shared with Congress and the public to hold the political officials’ requests
more accountable.

MCGARITY & WAGNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

STEALTH “SCIENCE” STRATEGIES

4/25/2019 3:58 PM

1797

agency. Managers would also be protected from disciplinary action
except through the office that hired them.
b. Concerns and Qualifications. There are both conceptual and
practical challenges to our proposal to firewall the technical analysis
and related decisions from an agency’s regulatory decisionmaking
process. These challenges are considered roughly in order of
importance, except for our final discussion of political feasibility.
Where there’s a will, there’s a way. The most obvious concern with
the proposals advanced here is that political officials will find a way
around this firewalled structure to meddle with the technical analysis
of the underlying research if the incentives are powerful enough. In
cases where politics can still permeate our suggested approach, the
reform will backfire by producing a façade of scientific independence
that further misleads onlookers. Alternatively, political appointees
who find themselves blocked by these firewalls and related legal
prohibitions could give up on science altogether or find a way to
eliminate the technical units and devise a much more politically
oriented approach to developing the scientific record. This has long
been a concern, for example, with the use of ombudsmen to represent
underserved communities and interests.406 The proposals, under this
view, are just stopgaps subject to a kind of nuclear arms race that will
find a way to sidestep legal constraints in ways that become ever more
dangerous over time.
Given the significance of the problems detailed in this Article and
the perverse role that the current unitary blueprint of the agency plays
in allowing political appointees to manipulate science, however, at least
some experimentation with firewalls seems warranted. In order to
provide an early warning of attempts to circumvent the firewalls, some
anticipatory measures could be instituted to detect and publicize them.
For example, regular audits of the processes could be instituted in the
initial design of the firewall or requested by members of Congress or
other parties. The audit would investigate how well the firewall is
working in practice and trace out complaints or other evidence of
problems. Indeed, anticipation of the audit itself may also serve as a
partial deterrent against circumvention attempts.

406. WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 63 (1983)
(“An organization that depends exclusively on legislators for funds will not deliberately
antagonize its legislative benefactors. In contrast, an organization that has the option of raising
funds through a variety of methods will be less constrained.”).
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Ensuring Scientific Integrity. A reverse concern holds that the
technical staff itself will be badly biased in ways that are difficult to
detect or control. In the public health field, there are concerns that the
staff could consist of public health missionaries and zealots who err on
the side of caution in ways that go well beyond what the evidence
suggests is necessary. Such systemic biases in the work of the technical
staff could introduce accountability problems because they will be
difficult to catch and correct.
Peer review and public notice and comment of each staff report
should help to expose some staff bias. To be sure, this will only work if
the peer reviewers are selected to be fair and skeptical. Public review
is also an important antidote to these concerns; under current
administrative procedures, these staff reports would be scrutinized not
only by the administration, but also by high stakes groups during the
decisionmaking process. This scrutiny will be particularly intense when
the staff’s findings cut against the interest of stakeholders who have
ample resources to engage in the process.
Nevertheless, to provide further assurance that the staff reports
are even-handed, an audit of the staff processes by an external
scientific body like the NAS might again prove useful in ensuring that
the firewall approach is working. Perhaps staff could also be
encouraged to present the technical reports at professional meetings or
even publish them or some part of them in scientific journals. The more
that these staff reports are treated as legitimate reviews of the scientific
literature within the profession, the more likely it is that they will meet
professional standards of quality and integrity.
Utilization. One of the most significant difficulties with the firewall
concept is ensuring that the technical assessment is in fact conducted
when needed. To address this risk, an initial scientific assessment could
be made mandatory as a prerequisite for all agency rules and guidances
that rely on scientific information. This mandate could also extend to
other agency science-intensive directives and policies. For example,
within one year after the agency launches a new project, it could be
considered a breach of the firewall not to convene a firewalled staff
assessment. In some matters, the staff may have nothing to add, but
consultation would be mandatory. Although this type of trigger may
leave some important agency decisions unprotected, experience can
hopefully be used to fine-tune the appropriate legal trigger.
Increasing Red Tape. Another worry is that the entire process
might become bogged down in red tape so that it becomes little more
than a paper tiger. Staff could dally on their technical assessments.
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Policy officials could ignore much of what the staff assessments offer.
And onlookers might well become too exhausted by the dual filings
and technicalities to identify, much less to file comments on or litigate
possible abuses. The already protracted and complicated rulemaking
process could become more so with little apparent offsetting
advantage.
However, if technical staff appreciates that more accessible
analyses will serve as a vital means of educating stakeholders and the
public, then the firewalls could produce stronger, more
comprehensible agency reports that communicate scientific
information more clearly than 500-page reports written in technical
jargon that few can understand.407 The more significant challenge may
be the converse—that the policy officials will not take the reports
seriously or will attempt to misrepresent the staff analyses in ways that
are difficult to catch. One way to make the political officials’ use of the
scientific record more transparent is to subject the final policy decision
to both staff and scientific review to spotlight these points of
manipulation and/or to add a role for staff dissent on the final decision.
Polarization. The firewall idea poses a very real risk of a
polarization within the agencies between career staff and political
appointees. Although this tension is something that has occurred in
past administrations in any event, our proposal could fan existing
flames. At least some experimentation to date, however, suggests that
this particular concern may not be a problem in at least some agencies.
The fact that EPA has successfully experimented with the firewall
concept for more than a decade in the NAAQS program, for example,
gives some reason to believe that such a structure will in fact prove
viable.408 In fact, if the rules for staff independence were clearer, the
tensions between career and political staff might actually decrease.
Political Feasibility. To be effective, the proposals advanced here
must be imposed on the executive branch by Congress through
legislation and enforced by the courts. Although the expectation of
congressional intervention in this highly polarized age might seem
farfetched, improving the scientific integrity of regulatory decisions, at
least in the abstract, should not be a partisan matter. In the course of
our research on deregulation, we have uncovered more than a few
allegations that appointees of Democratic presidents, particularly
407. See, e.g., WAGNER, ACUS STUDY, supra note 111, at 123–24 (observing this in the
NAAQS policy assessments).
408. See id. at 29–40 (describing the NAAQS process).
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Presidents Clinton and Obama, engaged in similar manipulative tactics
to increase the stringency of regulation. For example, the strict
adherence to worst case assumptions, including the protective linear
dose response curve in carcinogen risk assessment models, has been of
concern to the chemical industry for decades.409 At bottom, this
concern is driven by the belief that the agency is employing such
models in unjustifiably protective ways that do not employ the best
scientific evidence.410
Indeed, all of the affected interest groups from all sides of these
issues—affected industries, public interest groups, scientific
organizations—purport to want regulatory decisions to be based on
sound science. If that is the case, repairing structural deficiencies in
institutional design should draw bipartisan support. Legislation that
improves the scientific integrity of agency decisions in ways that curb
presidential power could also be the type of legislative reform that is
attractive to members of Congress who are well aware of the fact that
administrations—and hence the scope of a political party’s power—can
swing dramatically from one election cycle to another. Finally, if media
coverage and reactions of the scientific community to political
manipulation are indications of the public’s current sentiment toward
these issues, the legislation should draw strong public support. It is
possible, in other words, that the merits of instituting processes that
deter the political manipulation of science may be so clear that
legislation may be politically viable at some point in the future, at least
when the sitting president is not likely to veto the bill.
B. Reinforcing Reforms
Beyond the firewall, other reinforcing legal reforms are needed to
ensure adequate separation of the staff technical analysis from the
policymaking apparatus. We identify two additional reforms below.
1. Science Advisory Boards. The Federal Advisory Committee
Act (“FACA”) provides the legal rules governing the establishment of

409. See, e.g., EPA’s Proposed Rule on Transparency in Regulatory Science Gets It Right When
It Comes to the Best Available Science and Non-linear Modeling Approaches, AM. CHEMISTRY
COUNCIL: AM. CHEMISTRY MATTERS (May 3, 2018), https://blog.americanchemistry.com/2018
/05/epas-proposed-rule-on-transparency-in-regulatory-science-gets-it-right-when-it-comes-tothe-best-available-science-and-non-linear-modeling-approaches [https://perma.cc/7PSB-XART].
410. See James W. Conrad, Jr., The Reverse Science Charade, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10306, 10306–
08 (2003).
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science advisory boards,411 but with respect to ensuring objectivity,
FACA (and its authorizing regulations) only provides that the
committee membership must “be fairly balanced in terms of the points
of view represented and the functions to be performed.”412 As a result,
the FACA statute and its implementing regulations leave the necessary
qualifications, conflict disclosures, and other decisions regarding the
selection of scientific peer reviewers unspecified and therefore largely
legally unconstrained.413
As long as FACA gives political appointees this broad discretion
in assembling science advisory boards, some administrations will
exploit that freedom to stack or otherwise manipulate peer review
bodies to achieve favorable outcomes. As the HHS spokesperson
conceded in defending the George W. Bush administration’s stacking
of scientists to serve on CDC’s Advisory Committee on Childhood
Lead Poisoning Prevention, “it [is] disingenuous to criticize the Bush
administration for installing like-thinking individuals [on science
advisory boards] when every administration does that. . . . That’s like
saying, Gosh, there’s gambling going on in this casino.”414
More precise legal ground rules governing science advisory boards
are long overdue. In addition to amending FACA to constrain agency
discretion in selecting scientific advisory committees, Congress should
specify rules—perhaps by linking legal requirements to existing
scientific practices in force at the biomedical journals—to govern
agency selection of individual scientific experts to serve as peer
reviewers when there is neither time nor money to create full advisory
boards. There are several useful models for devising these reforms.415
However it is done, a revised process must establish legal guiderails for
the design of these science advisory boards and peer reviewers that
curb opportunities for political manipulation.

411. 5 U.S.C. app.2 § 3(2) (2012).
412. Id. § 5(b)(2).
413. See generally GAO, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
COULD HELP AGENCIES BETTER ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE (Apr. 2004)
(recommending “promising practices and measures that can better ensure independence and
balance and promote transparency in the federal advisory committee system”).
414. Dan Ferber, Critics See a Tilt in a CDC Science Panel, 297 SCIENCE 1456, 1457 (2002)
(quotations omitted).
415. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, supra note 238, at 17–26 (providing detailed
proposals).
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2. Deliberative Process Privilege. The deliberative process
privilege currently protects internal political discussions, including
those involving the manipulation of scientific information, from public
view through an exception to FOIA.416 Reform, at a minimum, should
legislatively limit this deliberative process protection so that it does not
cover political manipulation of science.417 In her article touting the
virtues of presidential administration, Justice Kagan in fact gestured
towards the need for greater transparency in the executive’s
engagement with the scientific record.418 She suggested, for example,
that presidential review should not only “operate with an attitude of
respect toward agency experts,” but also that “these differences
[between the expertise of agencies and the White House] counsel
hesitation both in acknowledging and asserting presidential authority
in areas of administration in which professional knowledge has a
particularly significant and needed function.”419
As a first step, the deliberative process privilege should be revised
to exclude any discussions that violate the firewall proposed here.
Deliberative process protection should also not extend to any
communications that violate scientific misconduct rules or scientific
integrity rules promulgated by agencies. Scientific misconduct in most
agencies involves the “fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in
proposing, performing, or reviewing scientific and research activities,
or in the publication or reporting of these activities; scientific
misconduct does not include honest error or differences of opinion.”420
These decisions about whether communications violate deliberative
process, and hence must be made public under FOIA requests, should
be made by the scientific integrity officers, the respective Office of the
Inspector General, or some other neutral group.
CONCLUSION
Like playing with fire, politicians playing with scientific
information can be dangerous. Part I of this Article has demonstrated
how politically appointed officials, on both sides of the aisle, can
employ many strategies to manipulate or ignore scientific information

416. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012).
417. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 124, at 1646 (similarly suggesting that agency scientific
recommendations should be subject to FOIA and not exempted as deliberative process).
418. Kagan, supra note 281, at 2356.
419. Id.
420. U.S. EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY, supra note 313, at 4.
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in ways that allow agency decisions to reach politically predetermined
outcomes. Convinced that such decisions are inconsistent with sound
administrative practice and, in most cases, with agency statutes, we
argue in Part II that existing legal and cultural constraints on such
political manipulation are insufficient to prevent determined political
appointees from employing those strategies. We therefore argue in
Part III that more rigid rules are needed to constrain how regulatory
agencies employ science in their decisionmaking processes. This
includes a legally enforceable institutional design that bars some of the
basic work of scientific and technical staff from influence by politically
appointed officials. Until there are external controls on the
manipulation of science by the executive branch, we expect the
problems we have identified in Part I to steadily worsen. Our hope is
that Congress will recognize the value of regulation based on properly
vetted science and statutory policy and take action before fact-free
decisionmaking to advance the policies of the chief executive becomes
the norm.

